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PREFACE
This study was inspired by the German gunboat Pan/her. During the reading of a
textbook discussing the Agadir Incident, the Panther first came to my attention. In
researching the history ofthis particular warship, its participation in the Venezuelan Blockade
of 1902-1903 was mentioned. After reading a few accounts of this incident, I came to the
realization that all of the books that I was reading made the assumption that the German
Imperial Navy was stronger than the United States Navy at the time of the Venezuelan
Blockade. After years ofinterest in naval history, I was positive that this was not true. This
paper is the result.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
"Developing nation" is the term used today. At the beginning of the twentieth
century, the terms most often used were "backwards" or "primitive" nations. It was a
common practice for the more highly developed powers to view less "civilized" countries as
open areas for economic exploitation and sometimes, colonial expansion. As more industrial
powers emerged in the late 1800's, competition for the world.' s markets often became intense.
England, the first country to industrialize, led all countries in overseas investment. Germany
and the United States, both ofwhom were rapidly growing industrial powers, were beginning
to compete with Great Britain in the world economy. As both countries strove to expand
their economic power throughout the world, it was inevitable that conflicts of interest would
arise. As naval power commonly protected overseas interests, these disputes could be very
dangerous situations.
Under Kaiser Wilhelm n, Germany wanted to create its own empire and eventually
challenge England's status as the world's leading economic and naval power. Germany
looked to Great Britain as a model. British economic strength was based on their empire,
which provided raw materials for industry and markets for its products. The Kaiser wanted
to create a shift in Germany's power status from a continental power to a world power. An
adherent of the theories of Alfred T. Mahan, Wilhelm II thought that a strong navy was the
only method of obtaining such power. Germany already possessed arguably the strongest
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army in Europe. Under the leadership of Admiral Alfred Tirpitz, they set out to build a fleet
that would pose a threat to the British Royal Navy. This plan, however, was a long-term
arrangement. Only through a buildup of ships, at the rate of approximately three battleships
a year, for a twenty year period, could they finish the proposed fleet. Until that point, serious
efforts at empire building would have to wait. I
This did not mean that Germany lay idle. They established colonies in Africa, China
and most important, on islands in the Pacific. It was here that German and United States'
interests first conflicted in the late 1800's and these problems carried over into the new
century. Problems that had arisen in Samoa and the Philippines had left many Americans
suspicious ofGermany. Some, including Theodore Roosevelt, beli.eved that Gennany posed
the only immediate threat to the security of the United States. Any Gennan actions came
under scrutiny by observers in the United States. When Gennany joined England in a
blockade against Venezuela in December 1902, the United States immediately began to
question German intentions.
During the 1890s, the United States began to assert its power in the western
hemisphere. Isolation had typified American foreign policy to date. The United States did
not want to embroil themselves in European affairs and the Monroe Doctrine expressed their
wish that Europe stay out of American affairs. As the United States industrialized, its
economic interests began to expand outside the country. In the 18805, the United States
began to construct a modern navy, and by the early 1890s its warships were equal in ability
to any in the world? As American commercial interests grew throughout the world, the need
to protect these interests became more vital. The navy was responsible for protecting these
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interests, but had to operate in two oceans, to do so. A need for rapid deployment to either
ocean increased the need for a canal, under United States control, through Central America.
Thus, control of the Caribbean became critical to the security of the United States. In 1898,
the United States fought Spain in a short war that removed Spain from the region and gave
the United States a small "empire" in the Pacific and Caribbean. The United States was
rapidly establishing hegemony over this area.3
Joining with Great Britain to coerce the Venezuelan government into the repayment
for debts, Germany created difficulties for itself, its British allies, and the United States.
When Venezuela, after years of civil war, fell into arrears with these powerful European
nations in the early 1900s, Germany and Great Britain decided to cooperate in a joint
blockade against Venezuela. Although the Roosevelt administration agreed to allow the
action at the beginning, it soon became wary of allowing these countries to remain in the
area. The United States government percieved a threat to the Monroe Doctrine and its
position in the Caribbean. The Roosevelt administration intervened to end the blockade and
submit the grievances of the interested powers to an international tribunal at the Hague.
The threat percieved by the Roosevelt administration had no basis in fact. Germany
was not going to take territory in Venezuela. This would have meant war with the United
States. As this study will show, neither the United States nor Germany could wage war on
the other country. The vast separation of the two nations by the Atlantic Ocean made any
conflict a naval contest by default. The naval construction programs of both countries
produced vessels well-suited to the policies that created them, but left each navy without the
capability to make a transoceanic voyage to attack the opposing side. The logistics involved
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made such an adventure completely out of the question. The best the two countries could
have done in the event of hostilities is glare at each other across the ocean.
When Gennany and Great Britain joined in the blockade against Venezuela,
the United States immediately concluded that Germany desired territory in the region. Despite
the British being the major force in the action, Gennany became the focus of American
concerns. American newspapers of the period show that the biggest fear was that Germany
wanted to gain territory in the region and was using the blockade as a pretext for just such
a move. The Germans, however, had too small a force (four ships) to take and hold even a
small piece ofland in the face of the United States' naval strength in the area. The German
lack ofability to support fleet operations in the Caribbean region ruled out any possibility that
they could take any territory and keep in defiance of the Monroe Doctrine.
Nonetheless, the Roosevelt administration and the American and British Press
remained skeptical of German motives. All were certain that the Kaiser was interested in
more than debt collection. This was the stated purpose of the blockade, but this explanation
is suspect. There is another possibility. It was Germany's purpose to create problems
between the United States and England. IfGermany could achieve a split between these two
countries, it would greatly benefit them in their rivalry with England for naval and economic
superiority. The plan failed because Gennany underestimated the anti-German sentiment that
existed in the United States and Great Britain.
Every major work regarding the Venezuelan blockade cites indisputable facts on the
subject. The actual problems arose from the instability of the Venezuelan Government, led
by the PresidentfDictator Cipriano Castro. After years of an ongoing civil war, the country
4
had fallen into arrears with several large European nations that had inve ted heavily in the
region. Three of the concerned parties were Germany, Great Britain and Italy. Castro and
his government were unable to meet the demands for payment and Germany was the first
country to react.
In December 1901, Germany announced its intention to collect the money owed to
its citizens. The first measure prescribed was a blockade of the major Venezuelan ports. If
this did not bring Castro to terms, Germany suggested that the temporary occupation of the
Venezuelan customs houses at these harbors might be necessary to recover the necessary
funds. The leading proponent of German action was the German Chancellor, Bernhard von
Bulow. He advocated commencing action on Venezuela in the summer of 1902. Kaiser
Wilhelm II decided against this, postponing any action until after a goodwill trip by Prince
Heinrich to the United States in early 1902.4
In January 1902, Germany and England began discussion of a possible joint action
against Venezuela, beginning in December of 1902. By July, the two powers had formalized
their plans. On November 11, the allies formalized the alliance by agreeing not to seek a
separate peace with the Venezuelan government during the joint action. On this date,
England also notified the United States of its intention to blockade Venezuela in company
with Germany. 5
The official United States response did not object to Germany's coercive methods.
John Hay, the Secretary of State, replied that they had defined the United States position in
Roosevelt's annual message of 1901, where Roosevelt declared that the Monroe Doctrine
only guaranteed "that there would be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American
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power on American soil." This policy "has nothing to do with the commercial relations of any
American power" and the United States will not "guarantee any State against punishment if
it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the fonn of the acquisition of
territory by any non-American power.,,6
In November 1902, the United States began assembling its fleet at Culebra, off the
coast ofPuerto Rico, for large-scale naval maneuvers. The first to arrive were the Caribbean
squadron of four cruisers and two gunboats. They arrived on November 5, 1902. On the
twenty-first, four battleships arrived from the North Atlantic Squadron. By the end of the
month the arrival of two more battleships and four cruisers from the European and South
Atlantic squadrons augmented the fleet. On November 18, Roosevelt ordered Admiral
Dewey, the highest ranking naval officer in the United States Navy, to take command of this
impressive fleet. The navy also put ashore a force of six hundred marines at Culebra.
Together this fleet numbered more than fifty vessels. This included six battleships, eight
cruisers, two gunboats, and seven torpedo boats, all ofmodern construction. 7
The two Allies officially notified Washington of their intentions to proceed with a
blockade of Venezuela on November 25. Venezuela received an ultimatum from Great
Britain and Germany on December 7. Six days later, a memorandum from the German
Ambassador, Theodor von Rolleben, notified the United States that Gennany would blockade
Venezuelan ports and occupy its customs houses if necessary, but in no way was considering
the occupation of any Venezuelan territory. Again, the United States did not object to the
blockade. The GenTIans believed that the United States had given them a "free hand" to use
6
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Meanwhile, the combined naval forces of the two European powers had arrived off
Venezuela. The entire fleet consisted of twelve vessels, four German and eight British. Most
ofthese were small cruisers or gunboats. On the December 9, after receiving no reply to the
ultimatum, Germany and England began to seize the vessels of the Venezuelan Navy. They
captured the entire Venezuelan fleet, save one vessel, in two days. Unable to spare any men
to form prize crews, or to provide a ship to tow the vessels away, the Germans promptly sank
two of the captured ships.9
President Castro, deprived ofany ability to resist the blockade at sea, began arresting
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British and German nationals, "thundered nationalistic speeches, and called his countrymen
to anns." The Allies met this resistance with force of arms, on the December 13 a joint force
of British and German vessels shelled two forts at Puerto CabeUo. That same day, Castro
asked the United States to get the dispute settled by arbitration. They immediately dispatched
the offer to both blockading powers and by December 18, both England and Gennany "had
officially informed the United States that they would accept arbitration."10
This did not mean an end to the crisis. Germany and England proceeded with their
original plans and began a blockade of Venezuelan ports on December 20. Until they
reached agreeable terms among all powers concerned, the warships would remain to ensure
that Castro would not renege on his agreement. Germany furthur aggravated the situation by
demanding an immediate payment of $325,000 before submitting to arbitration. With no
shipping traffic due to the blockade, Castro had no means of raising this enormous sum of
money. As long as Germany held out for immediate payment, they would prolong the
blockade. 11
The United States was not idle during this period. The planned maneuvers had gone
on as scheduled and they had assembled the entire fleet under the command of Dewey on
December 8, 1902, the day after the ultimatum to Venezuela by Germany and Great Britain.
The sinking of the Venezuelan ships and the shelling of the Venezuelan forts began a wave
ofanti-Gennan sentiment in the United States, especially in the press. On the eighteenth of
December, just before the blockade went into effect, the United States sent four battleships
to Trinidad, just off the Venezuelan coast. 12
Although the Kaiser had at first suggested that Theodore Roosevelt take charge of
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the arbitration, the United States preferred submission of the dispute to the international
tribunal at the Hague. Herbert Bowen, the United States Ambassador to Venezuela, would
act as the official representative ofthe Venezuelan govenunent at the Tribunal. The talks that
began at the Venezuelan Claims Conference in Washington did not end until February 13,
1903, with the signing of the Washington protocols. Venezuela and its European creditors
worked out the final details at the Hague. The negotiations continued until February 1904,13
During the Washington negotiations, another incident in Venezuela increased
international tensions. On January 17, 1903, The Gennan gunboat Panther, searching for the
last Venezuelan naval vessel, entered the port of Maracaibo, where the fort of San Carlos
opened fire on the vesseL The Gennan ship was forced to withdraw. The Gennan Naval
commander ordered an immediate reprisal, sending the three larger vessels of his fleet to
bombard and destroy the fort at San Carlos. 14
In Washington, the talks had deadlocked because ofGennan demands for immediate
payment. By early February, Great Britain was anxious to end the Venezuelan affair. Public
opinion and the British press were as anti-Gennan in sentiment as in America. By the
February 7 the British were contemplating voiding their agreement with Gennany and signing
a separate treaty with Venezuela. The German position, which had remained staunch
throughout, suddenly reversed itself and on the February 13 they signed the Washington
protocols. All the powers lifted the blockade shortly afterwards. I S
These are the facts of the Venezuelan blockade and none of these are under dispute
by historians of the subject. The major controversies surrounding this affair concern the
resolution of the conflict and Gennan intentions. The major issue concerns Theodore
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Roosevelt and the use of the "Big Stick," the threat of force, in forcing the Germans to
cooperate. The other issue directly concerns the "German Challenge to the Monroe
Doctrine and whether the Germans were really after debt collection or were seeking territorial
gain in the Caribbean.
A letter from Theodore Roosevelt to William R Thayer in 1915 marked the beginning
of the debate, with its publication in The Life ofJohn Hay. 16 The letter reads as follows:
There is now no reason why I should not speak of the facts connected
with the disagreement between the United States and Germany over the
Venezuelan matter, in the early part ofmy administration as President, and of
the final amicable settlement of the disagreement.
At that time the Venezuelan Dictator-President Castro had committed
various offenses against European nations, including Germany and England.
The English Government was then endeavoring to keep on good terms with
Germany, and on this occasion acted jointly with her. Germany sent a
squadron ofwar vessels to the Venezuelan coast, and they were accompanied
by some English war vessels. There was no objection whatever to Castro's
being punished, as long as the punishment did not take the form of seizure of
territory and its more or less permanent occupation by some Old-World
power. At this particular point, such seizure of territory would have been a
direct menace to the United States, because it would have threatened or
partially controlled the approach to the projected Isthmian Canal.
I speedily became convinced that Germany was the leader, and the
really formidable party in the transaction; and that England was merely
following Germany's lead in rather half-hearted fashion. I became convinced
that England would not back Germany in the event ofa clash over the matter
between Germany and the United States, but would remain neutral. I also
became convinced that Germany intended to seize some Venezuelan harbor
and turn it into a strongly fortified place of arms, on the model ofKiauchau,
with a view to exercising some degree of control over the future Isthmian
Canal, and over South American affairs generally.
According to Roosevelt, he then attempted through diplomatic channels to get
Germany to accept arbitration. When Germany refused to arbitrate, he assembled the battle
fleet and placed it at war readiness. He then called in the German Ambassador, von Holleben.
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Roosevelt continues:
I saw the Ambassador, and explained that in view ofthe presence of
the German Squadron on the Venezuelan coast I could not permit longer
delay in answering my request for an arbitration, and that I could not
acquiesce in any seizure ofVenezuelan territory. The Ambassador responded
that his government could not agree to arbitrate, and that there was no
intention to take "permanent" possession ofVenezuelan territory. 17
Roosevelt then pointed out that Kiaochow (Germany's Chinese Possession) was also
not a permanent possession but under a 99-year lease. The United States would not condone
the establishment of a fortified naval base in the Caribbean. He then informed the
Ambassador that if the German government did not agree to arbitration "within a certain
specified number of days," he would order Dewey's fleet to Venezuela to ensure that
Germany did not take possession of any territory. Roosevelt met again with von Holleben
a few days later, according to this account, and Holleben informed him that he had received
no word from the German Government regarding Roosevelt's request. Roosevelt continues:
I informed him that in such event it was useless to wait as long as 1 had
intended, and that Dewey would be ordered to sail twenty-fours in advance
of the time I had set. He expressed deep apprehension, and said that his
government would not arbitrate. However, less than twenty-four hours
before the time I had appointed for cabling the order to Dewey, the Embassy
notified me that his Imperial Majesty the German Emperor had directed him
to request me to undertake the arbitration myself I felt, and publicly
expressed, great gratification at this outcome, and great appreciation of the
course the German Government had finally agreed to take. Later I received
the consent ofthe German Government to have the arbitration undertaken by
The Hague Tribunal, and not by me. 18
This explanation, as first revealed in Thayer's book, became the accepted explanation
for the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902-1902. In the 1920's, historians such as Joseph B. Bishop
and Alfred Dennis accepted the Roosevelt account as genuine. 19 The first critics of the
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Roosevelt story were Howard Hill and 1. Fred Rippy, who suspected that Roosevelt was off
on his details. They believed that Roosevelt could not have delivered his ultimatum to von
Holleben., but to his replacement, Baron Speck von Sternburg, a mend of Roosevelt. These
writers believe that Roosevelt's ultimatum occurred in the late stages of the crisis, in late
January-early February 1903. They also maintained that Roosevelt had been mistaken about
German territorial ambitions at this time.20
The most scathing rebuttal of the Roosevelt account is the German historian Alfred
Vagts. The multi-volume work Deutsch/and und die Vereinigten Staaten in der We/tpolitik
remains the finest study ofGerman documentation of this period to this date. Vagts found
nothing in German archives to back Roosevelt's contention that he delivered an ultimatum
to Germany. He also finds no evidence ofany official Gennan designs on territorial expansion
in Central or South America. Vagts claims that this fear was the creation ofRoosevelt and
supporters of naval building in the United States. Disappointed that Congress had not
approved a bill for increased naval expenditures, Roosevelt used the Venezuelan blockade to
incite fear into the American people to generate support for a larger navy. 21
Another critic of Roosevelt is the historian Dexter Perkins. Perkins wrote that
Roosevelt invented his account to enhance his own image. It was nothing but "legend"
invented by Roosevelt and his admirers. Perkins claims that Chancellor von Bulow had things
well in hand. Despite the oft-quoted ranting of the Kaiser and the wishes of Admiral von
Tirpitz and the pro-navy crowd, mendly relations with the United States were the primary
goals ofthe German Foreign office throughout this period. According to Perkins, Roosevelt
never issued any warnings to Gennany and points out, like Vagts, that no documentary
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evidence exists to support Roosevelt's contentions.22
After World War Two, some historians began to reexamine the Roosevelt story and
began to defend the account. In 1946, Seward W. Livermore did a study of United States
naval records ofthe period leading up to and during the crisis and found evidence to support
Roosevelt's claim that he had assembled the fleet in response to the German threat.
Livennore found that the earliest preparations for the naval maneuvers began in January 1902,
shortly after Germany announced its intention to use coercion in Venezuela at some future
date. He found that the navy had made preparation to occupy with American troops any
possible sites that Germany might be planning to seize. They positioned the fleet close to any
possible trouble spots and preparations ofthe base at Culebra as a forward base of operations
months before recieving any orders for the fleet to assemble there. It is Livermore's
contention that Roosevelt was responsible for the fleet concentration in December but that
it was not a hastily conceived idea, but part ofa long-term strategy planned for many months.
The fleet acted as leverage, and was the key tool used by Roosevelt to force Germany to
accept arbitration. 23
Livermore's account strongly favors Roosevelt. He states that an actual ultimatum
to Germany, despite the lack of archival references, is not out of the question. However,
Livermore makes it clear that the presence alone of the fleet in such strength was all the
leverage that Roosevelt needed to control the situation. Livermore concludes that while
Roosevelt may have been guilty of embellishing some details to favor himself, there is some
factual basis to the story as related to Thayer.24
Another pro-Roosevelt historian is Howard K. Beale, who also found a factual base
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to the lbayer letter. Beale's main argument is that any inaccuracies in the story are the fault
of Thayer, who prodded Roosevelt for months to get the story from him. He is also one of
the fIrst historians to note that Roosevelt often handled diplomacy himself outside nonnal
channels. Roosevelt, he claims, often ignored the State Department and military commanders
and undertook the problems of state privately. In this manner, Roosevelt may have issued a
warning to Germany verbally, with no written documentation to prove that it ever happened.
Beale believes that in this manner, Roosevelt allowed the Kaiser and Germany to back down
on their demands without giving the appearance ofweakness.25
In 1964, Dana G. Munro resurrected the interpretation offered by Dennis and Bishop
in the late 1920's. He believes that Roosevelt did threaten Germany with the use of the
United States navy, but that it was in February, not December as indicated in the Thayer
letter. Munro writes that even as late as December 26, the situation in Venezuela did not
alarm Roosevelt. It was only after all the parties involved had placed demands for immediate
payment from the Venezuelan Government and thus threatened to drag the blockade on
indefinitely that Roosevelt felt compelled to aet. 26
Paul S. Holbro, in 1969, concluded that Roosevelt did not need to issue a formal
ultimatum to Germany. By studying the newspapers of the period, he found that most of the
diplomacy ofthe period was what Holbro calls "public" diplomacy. The press kept the public
well informed about every move made during the crisis, including s.hip movements,
discussions with the powers, and the well-documented anti-German sentiment that prevailed
throughout the country. Holbro believes that Roosevelt deliberately fed information to the
press, knowing that Germany was monitoring the newspapers in both the United States and
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England. Roosevelt never needed to send an ultimatum to Germany officially, it was done
through "public diplomacy" in the press and through speeches. Holbro's argument is in
extreme contrast to historians like Beale, who stress the secrecy with whioh Theodore
Roosevelt often handled affairs of state. 27
Edward B. Parsons is another defender ofthe Roosevelt narrative. In 1970, he found
that "the essentials of the Roosevelt story are true." Parsons believes that Roosevelt
downplayed his role in the crisis, omitting "certain coercive actions" he used to convince
Germany that the United States was prepared to go to war over Venezuela. In this account,
secrecy is a key factor. Parsons makes note of secret orders to Dewey to keep the fleet ready
for immediate action and Roosevelt's secret orders to the Navy to make all preparations for
war. Parsons also believes that any ultimatum to Germany was most likely in the latter stages
of the crisis, although he does not discount the possibility of an earlier threat. In fact he notes
that Roosevelt forced Germany to alter its position on two separate occasions, once in
December and again in February. An ultimatum on either or both dates is possible, according
to Parsons?8
In 1973, Richard D. Challener denied Livermore's thesis of the planned naval
response to the German threat. He found the naval build up had nothing to do with
Venezuela or its "international difficulties." The presence of the fleet in such numbers was
a coincidence which Roosevelt used to his advantage. The fleet became a tool of diplomacy,
"a political makeweight," used to apply pressure to Germany. Challener concludes~ "Naval
records ... simply support the conclusion that whatever the President may have done about
the blockade ofVenezuela, his action was, as with so many of his diplomatic efforts, personal
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and individual, something he did on his own initiative and responsibility."29
Lester D. Langley believes that Roosevelt's account is not "altogether a fabrication)
but should be suspect due to "Roosevelt's Germanophobia during the war years and ... the
human tendency to exaggerate things in recounting an incident." Langley believes, like
Dexter Perkins, that Germany had no territorial ambitions in Venezuela at this time. Langley
stresses the caution that both England and Germany took throughout the affair regarding the
United States and the Monroe Doctrine. This was an indication of their deference to the
actual military situation in the Caribbean, where the United States held every advantage. 30
As the arguments over the actual diplomatic events that occurred during this affair
attest, the lack ofprimary sources and actual documentation of the episode is a major problem
plaguing every historian who studies the Venezuelan crisis of 1902-1903. Frederick W.
Marks in 1979 did the most interesting study of this circumstance. Checking the relevant
records of the period, Marks found a serious gap existed in the documents in all three
countries involved. An almost complete void of German diplomatic documents for the entire
period of the crisis exists. What little documentation there is is unimportant and generally
unrelated to the Venezuelan affair. He noted that the memoirs of both the Kaiser and
Chancellor von Bulow barely mentioned the blockade at all or made any reference either to
the United States or President Roosevelt. Correspondence between top German officials is
also scarce during the crisis. Marks also found a similar gap in the records ofboth the United
States and England. Important telegrams from the English Ambassador in Washington were
missing. John Hay's papers show only two documents for the month of December, both
trivial in nature. The American Embassy in Berlin was contained no files from October 17
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to December II, 1902. Records known to have existed were also found missing from State
Department files. Marks concludes from this evidence that there was something there that
all three countries were anxious to hide and that such an effort to cover up the facts is
evidence to support Roosevelt's narration of events during the blockade. His conclusion is
open to skepticism but the problem he confronts is very real to all historians confronting the
Venezuelan Blockade. The lack of documentation for the period leaves much room for
guesswork and speculation.31
David Healy, in 1988, also supports the Roosevelt account. Roosevelt became
convinced that Genna.ny was after land in Venezuela and used the presence of the fleet, there
by coincidence, as leverage to force an early end to the blockade. Roosevelt met German
reluctance to cooperate with the threat of force and a confrontation between the two powers
was a possibility. Healy maintains that the diplomacy of Germany, and England, did Dot
change with the end of the blockade but continued to "keep the issues alive in Roosevelt's
mind." A year later, in May 1904, the result was the first announcement of the Roosevelt
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.32
Nancy Mitchell, like Perkins and Langley, believes that Germany did not have
territorial ambitions in the Caribbean at this time. In a 1996 article, Mitchell argues that
Germany had no expansionist goals during the blockade, but rather that it was exceedingly
cautious and followed the British lead throughout the affair. Roosevelt had made a mistake
when he agreed in principle to allow the blockade in the first place. Mitchell believes that the
United States did not have the necessary strength to confront Germany militarily in the region.
Mitchell claims that Germany had superior naval strength to the United States at this time and
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"would have won a naval war waged in that region." Roosevelt's diplomacy was the result
ofhis trying to overcome his original mistake. This led to his sending ambiguous signals to
both Germany and England that they could easily misconstrue and possibly created major
diplomatic crises with either of the European nations. It is Mitchell's conclusion that far too
much emphasis has been placed on the Roosevelt Ultimatum issue and not enough on actual
German intentions during the crisis. Germany was not after territorial gain but intended only
to improve Anglo-German relations. In the end, they achieved the opposite. The Venezuelan
blockade strengthened Anglo-American ties and damaged German relations with both
countries irreparably. 33
In a recent biography, H. W. Brands offers a new argument supporting the possibility
that Roosevelt's ultimatum did occur. Roosevelt, he argues, was too tied up with internal
problems with the coal industry to "give fuU consideration of the potential consequences of
the GenTIan-British blockade ofVenezuela." After solving the problems at home, Roosevelt
"changed his mind and decided to challenge the kaiser." Brands believed that the pres also
played a role in Roosevelt's decision: "Roosevelt was accustomed to being accused of being
too bellicose; he privately enjoyed it. He wasn " used to being called too soft; he didn't like
that at all." Once he had decided, Roosevelt called in the German Ambassador, von HoUeben,
and issued his threat to use the United States fleet as related in the previous chapter. 34
Despite the lack of archival records, Brands argues, it is "possible that things
happened more or less as Roosevelt recalled them." Theodore Roosevelt "wasn't one to
launch into histrionics to make a point." He realized that "it would only make future relations
more difficult if the German leader were embarrassed by an obvious show offorce. The fewer
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people who knew about any ultimatum, the better." The lack of any specific orders to the
fleet meant «that the maneuvers remained maneuvers; the president's ultimatum, if any,
worked. ,,35
As demonstrated from the above examples, two sides exist in the historiography of
the Venezuelan Blockade of 1902-1903. The pro-Roosevelt theorists believe the German
plans to take territory in Venezuela ended with the President's use of the "big stick," in the
form ofthe United States Navy. These authors generally portray Germany as the aggressor
with the English duped into cooperation by a scheming Kaiser. The other side usually adopts
the stance of Alfred Vagts. No evidence exists of any ultimatum to Germany, there were
no German territorial designs in the Venezuelan region, and Britain, not Germany, was the
leading member in the coalition.
The truth lies somewhere between the two theories, because both arguments have
points that are valid. There certainly is no evidence of German territorial designs in
Venezuela in 1902-1903. The work of both Vagts and Mitchell have proved this. Mitchell
makes a large mistake in assessing the strength ofGermany's navy at this time. As this study
will show, the United States battleships of this period were far superior to German
contemporaries and Gennan battleships la,eked the range to get to the Caribbean to fight a
war. Germany did not possess a navy as powerful as the United States and had no way to get
its fleet across the Atlantic due to these design and logistical problems. Germany could not
support or protect a colony in Central America during 1902-1903.
Evidence is ample that Roosevelt used the presence of the Navy to pressure Germany
and England and force an end to the blockade. What primary evidence exists seems to rule
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out Roosevelt's ultimatum in December 1902 but a possibility exists that those historians
who opt for the February date may be correct. The main problem with the ultimatum
theorists is the assumption that this would result in war between the United States and
Germany. Roosevelt's account says nothing of war, but that the navy would ensure that
Germany took no territory. This may have resulted in a minor naval skirmish, in which the
United States Navy completely outclassed the four small German vessels, but a war between
the United States and Germany was improbable, if not impossible.
Yet evidence supports the idea that Germany did have more than debt collection on
their minds. England may not have been an unwilling dupe, but Germany was manipulating
them. Sheltering behind the English Navy, Germany did all it could to hurt relations between
Great Britain and the United States, perhaps hoping to revive the anti-English sentiment that
existed in America during the earlier Venezuelan boundary dispute in 1896. By weakening
Anglo-American relations, they hoped that Germany could foster better relations with the
United States itself.
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CHAPTER II
THE GERMAN PROBLEM
Problems between the United States and Germany originated in the Pacific during the
Spanish-American War. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz observed: "Our relations with the United
States had undergone a needless change for the worse owing to the appearance of our
squadron offManila."1 Germany, like the United States, was an emerging imperialist power.
Many people in Germany felt that the country had "entered the field of colonial activity too
late." It could not afford to pass up any chances that arose to gain coaling stations throughout
the world. The Philippines "seemed to offer a rare chance" to gain some territory.2
Following Dewey's victory at Manila Bay the future of the Philippine Islands was in
doubt. Germany had hopes that they could gain a piece ofthis tenitory following the removal
of Spanish rule. Ernest R. May writes: "When the Manila battle indicated that Spain might
lose the Philippines, the Admiralty made up their minds that Germany should have a naval
base in the islands." The Naval Staff also decided to press for territorial rights in the
Carolines and Samoa. Gennany hoped to turn the disintegration of the Spanish Empire to its
own benefit. 3
Shortly after Dewey's victory, the German Asiatic fleet began sending fleet units to
Manila, under the pretext ofprotecting commercial interests. Germany soon "had a squadron
there as large as Dewey's, with more marines on board than there were Germans in the whole
archipelago."4 Problems soon arose between Dewey and the German commander, which led
to complaints from the United States to the GenTIan Emperor. Kaiser Wilhelm II replied that
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''the affairs ofthe squadron were the business of his navy and not fit subject for comment by
diplomats or foreigners."5 This did not improve the worsening relations between the two
countries.
The results of this incident at Manila were much to the detriment of German
ambitions. At first the United States was 'by no means sure they wanted the Philippines."6
The "rude gestures at Dewey" by the German navy gave the annexationists in the United
States "an additional argument for holding the Philippines after the war." Clearly, if the
United States did not take the Philippines, some European power would, and Germany
intended to get a share of the islands. The United States eventually decided to annex the
Philippines, which resolved the dispute. 7
Interestingly, Tirpitz had a different slant on this affair. During a visit in 1896, when
Tirpitz conunanded the German Asiatic Squadron, representatives of the rebels then fighting
the Spaniards approached him. The rebels suggested "the idea of establishing a German
protectorate" in the Philippines. Tirpitz maintains that "so far as I know, the idea of
extending German power to the Philippines was never afterwards seriously considered in any
quarter ofGermany." Tirpitz makes it appear that Dewey instigated the problems in German-
American relations, writing: "Whilst we appeared off Manila with a squadron which was
stronger than the American, we maintained ticklish relations between the two navies.,,8
Tirpitz does note that the affair had lasting significance: "There remained in the
United States ... the lasting suspicion that we had made an unsuccessful attempt to poach
on preserves which they had discovered first." This idea, helped along by "the English press
and diplomacy" increased suspicion in the United States that Germany was "cherishing
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-intentions on American territory." Tirpitz claims that the United States was "ignorant of
European affairs, and sensitive enough with their Monroe Doctrine to believe this kind of
nonsense. ,,9
Gennany's actions in the Philippines do not match Tirpitz' account. The German fleet
loitered in Manila Bay, in force greater than the Americans, until two heavy monitors (coastal
defense vessels) arrived from the United States. The German fleet then moved offshore, as
Tirpitz describes. That did not end Gennany's meddling in the Philippines. Even after the
peace treaty was signed which ceded the Philippines to the United States, the German Asiatic
fleet was trespassing in the vicinity of Cebu, which was held by insurgent forces opposed to
United States rule. In February 1899, Admiral Dewey was forced to send troops to Cebu to
meet the Gennan threat. This action finally removed Gennany from the Philippines. 10
Tirpitz' assessment of the lasting effects of the Philippine affair is entirely correct,
especially in naval circles. Admiral Dewey "never recovered from the acute case of
Gennanophobia he had acquired when Admiral Dietrichs sailed into Manila Bay in 1898."
These feelings were shared by the General Board of the Navy, which Dewey headed.
Suspicion of Germany "was a constant in the thinking ofthe General Board from 1898 to the
outbreak of the European conflict in 1914.,,11
The next area oftrouble between the United States and Gennany occurred in Samoa.
The Berlin Act of 1889 had placed these islands, which were independent, under the joint
supervision ofthe United States, Germany, and Great Britain. In 1898, the Samoan chief died
and Gennany and the United States became embroiled in a dispute over his replacement.
When the United States refused to recognize the most popular candidate, a civil war erupted.
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-Relations between Berlin and Washington became strained. Gennany, ever opportunistic,
hoped to use this crisis to "secure a long-desired partition of the islands between the three
powers."12
Bad feelings from the Manila affair were readily apparent. The Gennan. Chancellor,
Bernhard von BUlow, in a memorandum from March 1899 provides a perfect illustration.
Von Bulow very much wanted to pacify the United States. He declares that "we have very
great interest ... in maintaining good relations with that sensitive nation which is so difficult
to deal with." United States public opinion was in a "hostile mood" against Gennany due to
an "aggressive press." The press was "constantly nourished by existing business differences,
lying reports about our attitude in the Spanish-American war, and finally by recent events in
Samoa." Von BUlow also shows concern that the Gennan navy avoid any conflict with
United States warships because the "ships of His Majesty's cruiser squadron are the subject
of special resentment in the United States." Germany wished to settle any differences and
clear up the Samoan problem in "a friendly manner." A war between the United States and
Gennany "would be very unwelcome to us just now."l)
The situation deteriorated when shellfire from United States and British warships
damaged the Gennan consulate at Apia on March 15, 1899. Relations between the powers
worsened. The appointment of the United States' choice for chief ended the civil war on
March 23. To reduce frictions among the three powers, they agreed to divide the islands up,
just as Gennany had wished. However, this settlement did not dispel the suspicion of
Gennany that existed in the United States. l 4- Americans still fett that ·'At every disputed
strategic point in the Pacific, Gennany contested the American wishes during 1898 and
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-1899:'15
The dispute between the two countries now moved to the Caribbean. In 1900, a
German naval vesseL the Vineta, had spent three months surveying Margarita Island off the
coast of Venezuela. A United States observer, in March 1901, wrote a report claiming that
Germany planned to "acquire Margarita as a foothold on the Northern coast of South
America." Germany could use the island as a coaling and supply depot for their navy.
Venezuela owed large amounts of money to German interests and might lease the island to
Germany for a cancellation of these debts. 16
These reports disturbed the United States. The State Department made inquiries,
receiving a 4<German denial of any interest in Margarita." Despite the deniaL the United
States warned the Venezuelan government not to allow any German lease to the island and
dispatched American warships to La Guaira to monitor the region. Another vessel arrived
to check the accuracy of the original report and its report 4<satisfied the naval command in
Washington" that the findings were accurate. From that moment on, the island ofMargarita
became the focus ofUnited States war plans against Germany.11
The suspicions raised by Margarita Island had the most direct influence on the
Venezuelan Blockade. The United States quickly assessed German participation in the
blockade as an extension of the earlier incident. Whatever motives Germany may have had,
the United States believed that territory was the objective. Germany's failure to assess
correctly the degree of suspicion with which its actions were viewed made the Venezuelan
Blockade a German foreign policy disaster.
The final crisis before the Venezuelan Blockade occurred in early 1902. A civil war
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had broken out in Haiti and Germany became involved in the affair. In May 1902 a
provisional government had been set up in Haiti to rule until they could hold ,elections. The
rebellion continued and was further compounded when the leading Haitian admiral chose to
join the rebellion, taking with him his flagship, the Crete-a-Pierrot. On September 3, 1902,
this vessel stopped the German steamer Markomallnia and confiscated arms and ammunition
bound for the provisional government. This government sent a protest to the United States
in which they labeled the action "a real depredation, an act of piracy." They hoped that the
United States would intervene to "prevent the recurrence" of such actions. IS
Germany reacted swiftly and before the United States could intervene the German
gunboat Panther retaliated. On September 6, the Panther entered the harbor at Gonaives and
ordered the crew to surrender the Crete. They rejected this demand, and two more requests
to surrender. The Panther then opened fire on the Crete, eventually hitting her magazine and
destroying the vessel. Most of the crew had fled at the first shot, but the sinking killed the
rebellious admiral and two of his officers. 19
The United States responded to this action by reinforcing its fleet units in the area, but
launched no protests against the German action. The great surprise is that this affair has
received so little attention. This was a clear violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Germany was
interfering in the internal affairs ofHaiti: supplying guns and ammunition to one faction in an
ongoing civil war and using its naval power to aid the cause. A pro-German government on
Haiti was a possibility, perhaps giving Germany the port-of-call in the Caribbean they had
long wanted.
Attention soon shifted further south. The Panther sailed shortly afterward for
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-Venezuela and joined the German squadron in the blockade ofthat country. December 1902
marked the beginning ofwhat Nancy Mitchell calls "The Height of the German Challenge,,2o:
the Venezuelan Blockade. The events leading up to the blockade had left a lasting suspicion
ofGermany in the United States, which may have been unwarranted or exaggerated.
By looking at the record of German-American relations, it is obvious where the
mistrust ofGermany that preoccupied the United States in 1902-1903 began. However the
record shows that Germany did not seize territory through force of arms but by international
agreements. Germany originally obtained Samoa as a joint protectorate in the Berlin Act of
1899. Germany established colonies there by agreement among the three powers involved.
Spain sold the Caroline and Marianas Islands to Germany following the Spanish-American
War. Even the occupation and building of the German military base and port ofKiaochow
in China was the result oflong diplomatic negotiations with Russia, which originally held the
rights to the area. The Margarita Island affair in 1901 was a perfect fit to this pattern. If
Germany could get a lease of the island in exchange for Venezuelan debts, challenging the
legality of the transaction would be very hard. Certainly any country had a right to sell or
lease its property to any other. The German government had also been interested in
purchasing the Dutch West Indies but the transaction feU through when the United States
objected. The United States eventually purchased these islands. The German interdiction in
Haiti was an attempt to create a pro-German government in the Caribbean. None of this
evidence proves that Germany was likely to seize land in Venezuela during the blockade.
In the United States, public opinion, the press and the President remained convinced
that this was Germany's intent. In 1901, Theodore Roosevelt wrote that Germany viewed
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-the failure ofthe United States to add to its naval construction program as a sign of weakness
and "in a few years they will be in a position to take some step in the West Indies or South
America which will make us put up or shut up on the Monroe Doctrine." The Germans, he
believed, relied "upon their ability to trounce us" if the United States attempted to defend its
position. He was extremely warned that Germany and England might combine forces against
the United States. He recommended caution regarding England "from whom we have not the
least particle of danger to fear in any way or shape" adding that "the only power which may
be a menace to us in the in anything like the near future is Germany. "21
Roosevelt felt that the threat ofGermany was real. In reality, the threat was not there.
Germany did not possess a navy that could approach the strength of the United States fleet
at this time. It was unlikely that the German fleet could fight the United States on even terms,
let alone "trounce" them. If the Kaiser planned to grab territory in Venezuela, the probable
outcome was war with the United States. By necessity this would be a naval war. A study
of the actual strengths and the strategies of both fleets definitely rules out the idea that
Germany was after territorial acquisition during the Venezuelan affair. Claiming that war
between the United States and Germany was imminent during this crisis ignores the facts
completely.
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CHAPTER III
UNlTED STATES BATTLESHIP DESIGN AND NAVAL POLICY
In an age when the Cold War is still a recent memory, military power as an adjunct
of foreign policy are an accepted fact. The Cold War is often associated with the policy of
deterrence. The belief that by possessing the greatest number of superweapons will guarantee
peace is not a product of post-World-War-Two diplomacy. In the late nineteenth century,
the ultimate weapon was the battleship. In the 1890s, the United States began building a fleet
of these superweapons. Policies primarily defensive in nature inspired this construction.
United States strategy did not share the same motivations as other nations, notably England
and France. The battleships produced were radically different from those of the European
navi.es and the policies they represented determined their design.
The naval policy ofthe United States remained unchanged throughout the 18905 and
into the early 1900s. This policy emphasized the defense of the United States, and central to
the argument was the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. The concern for this document
grew throughout this period, becoming the central theme of most naval theorists. The
movement to build a canal through Central America made the Caribbean even more important
to United States interests.
When the United States began building its navy to modem standards in 1883, it
lacked the necessary industrial capacity with which to build modem warships. American
shipyards used materials purchased overseas to build the firdst new warships. These vessels
were smaller types; the largest built were cruisers. The navy established a gun factory in
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Washington, D.C. and contracted for armor plate from various steel manufacturers. In
response to military imperative, the United States created a shipbuilding industry where none
previously existed. This process was slow at first; it took almost seven years to build the
cruiser Chicago. Yet within ten years, industrial progress was so swift as to allow the United
States to build warships equal in construction and fighting qualities to any possessed by
foreign navies. In 1893, the United States had launched, or had under construction, six
modem battleships, including the Iowa, which were superior in power to any vessel then
afloat.)
It took many years to develop a cohesive naval policy. One responsibility of the navy
was to represent the United States overseas. The second was to protect the United States in
case of war. Because the navy was too small to fight a general war with the more powerful
European powers, war plans emphasized the protection ofthe coast. The mission of the navy
was not to project United States power to foreign waters, but to secure the safety of its own
borders. This policy ofcoastal defense became a fixture ofUnited States naval planning and
the United States built the fleet to match this strategy. These two missions of the navy each
required a different type of vessel. Overseas duty required long-range cruisers and the
security of the country was the responsibility of the battleships. 2
Another factor that figured into naval planning was the increasing importance of the
Monroe Doctrine in United States foreign policy. Ernest E. Russell, writing in 1893,
explained that "the maintenance of a navy in some degree commensurate with the interests
not alone of the United States but ofthe American continents was one of the duties devolved
upon us by our destiny." The United States must develop the necessary naval strength "to
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control any interoceanic ship canal or ship railway between the two Americas." In this
manner, United States naval policy encompassed both South and Central America in its
planning. 3
A third aspect that entered naval planning was the idea of deterrence. A powerful
fleet ofbattleships would not only discourage attacks on the country, but prevent a war from
occuning. In 1894, Charles H. Cramp, whose Philadelphia shipyard built many United States
battleships, declared that the "meaning of sea power to the United States" was "mainly of
deterrent significance." The possession of a fleet large enough to confront an enemy battle
fleet and menace its commerce "would materially affect the tenor of diplomacy and avert
war." He also added that "the absence or insufficiency of such equipment would invite war."
Thus, building a large navy was a method to insure peace. 4
As demonstrated above, the naval policy that emerged in the early 1890s had three
major themes that directly concerned the construction of battleships for the United States
Navy: protection of the United States coast from a foreign battle fleet, the possible
deployment in defense of other American nations, and to present a deterrent to foreign
aggression. The United States did not build battleships on the model of those of foreign
powers, but instead produced unique designs to match these requirements. From 1893 to
1904, battleship design was a direct product of these three requirements.
The decision to concentrate on coastal defense affected the size and form of United
States battleships. Standard battleships and armored cruisers of the foreign powers, most
notably England, had a draft exceeding twenty-five feet fully loaded. The United States had
very few harbors that exceeded twenty-five feet in depth. If the navy built battleships
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exceeding this depth, these vessels could not safely use harbors such as Boston and Newport
News. To achieve a designed draft of twenty-three feet, twenty-five fully loaded, the
resultant battleships were shorter and had a much wider beam than their European
counterparts. The lower draft of these vessels also offered benefits of a defensive nature as
United States battleships could "take refuge in our shallow harbors from deep draught foreign
battleships." Warships ofmore than twenty-three feet in draft were at a distinct disadvantage
when operating in the Caribbean and the Gulfof Mexico. Every new class ofbattleship built
in the United States prior to 1904 adhered to the designated draft of twenty-three feet.
Because of this fact, battleships of the United States fleet had smaller displacements than
European battleships. They had distinctive wide beams and less freeboard than those
employed by foreign builders. 5
To gain the desired deterrent effect, these new warships had to be a threat to those
of other nations. In 1890, Congress approved the construction of the three first-class
battleships. They demanded that "for the same displacement, our ships should be superior to
foreign ships in battery power." These Indiana-class battleships (see figure 1) could
probably face any battleship in the world with a fair chance ofwinning the confrontation. As
designed, these vessels carried thirteen-inch guns in double turrets fore and aft, a full inch
larger in caliber than most contemporary battleships. The biggest difference was the heavy
secondary armament. The Indiana class carried eight eight-inch guns in four turrets, two
turrets on each broadside. They also carried four six-inch rapid-fire and twenty six-pounder
rapid-fire weapons. This gave the Indiana-class battleships a secondary armament equal in
power to the largest armored cruisers on each broadside. When added to the thirteen inch
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Figure I. USS Indiana Note low freeboard and twin eight-inch guns below smokestack,
Figure 2 USS Kentucky (KearsaJ"ge Class) Good view ofsuperimposed eight-inch guns on top of 13" turret
guns, the battery of these vessels was the most powerful carried by any warship in the world. 6
A premium was also placed on protection. The Indiana class carried armor plating
of equal thickness to that carried by other nations, 4 inches to a maximum of 7.5 inches on
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-the main armor belt. This protection became increasingly larger as construction continued
through the 1890s. Typically, United States battleships carried armor unequaled in
comparable ships produced elsewhere. The Illinois class that followed the IndiatlQ class had
an armor belt of up to 16 inches compared to 9.45 maximum of the German Deutschland
class battleships. Ifthe guns gave American ships more destructive power, the superiority in
armor gave them the advantage of better survivability in battle.7
Some sacrifice was necessary to attain the superiority of these ships. Because of the
smaller displacement ofthese vessels, the weight ofadditional armor, and the space necessary
to accommodate the many guns, men and magazines of the battery, United States battleships
lacked the speed of their competitors and had a limited range of operations. These ships
could carry limited quantities ofcoal and available space restricted the size ofthe engines. But
speed and range were not as important to ships designed for defensive purposes. These ships
would not need to pursue an enemy fleet or venture far from the coast. Coal and supplies
were always nearby, so limited coal supplies would not be a serious impediment to the
prescribed missions of the fleet.
Another weakness was the low freeboard of these vessels~ rough seas hindered the
effectiveness ofUnited States battleships. They could not operate the big guns with the decks
awash. This left the ship at a disadvantage if confronted by a hostile vessel in heavy seas. In
1898, Navy Lieutenant E. W. Eberle suggested the Navy assign armored cruisers to protect
the battleships because they were unable to defend themselves in severe conditions. Still,
most observers felt that the flaws in these warships were not critical. The United States built
these ships to match the coastal defense policy that was then in effect; some deficiencies were
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-acceptable to create the vessel best suited for that purpose. 8
In 1895-%, Congress authorized two more battleships for the fleet. The Kentucky and
Kearsarge (see figure 2) were innovative designs. They used electrical power to operate the
auxiliary functions and, in place of the four eight-inch turrets, superimposed two eight-inch
guns over each main turret above the thirteen-inch guns. The power of the broadside
remained the same, but the savings in weight from the removal of the extra turrets allowed
the installation ofmore armor. These battleships retained the characteristic wide beam due
to the requirement ofa twenty-three-foot draft. The savings in space from the removal of the
additional gun turrets also allowed for a more powerful engine installation. This gave this
class of vessels a top speed of almost seventeen knots, which made them the fastest
battleships produced in the United States up to that time. When the Kentucky and Kearsarge
entered the fleet in ]899, one writer proclaimed them "the greatest fighting machines af]oat.,,9
The most prominent naval theorist of this period was Alfred Thayer Mahan. In 1895,
Mahan wrote a short article entitled "The Future in Relation to American Naval Power." He
described the changing political and economic situation of the United States in the world.
Mahan advocated increased naval spending as necessary for the new world interests of the
country: "the commercial enterprise of the people brought our interests into violent
antagonism with clear, unmistakable, and vital interests of foreign belligerent states." He did
not advocate imperialism, stating that "it is not necessary to acquire territory beyond [the] sea
in order to undergo serious international complications." Mahan declared. that "The world has
grown smaller" and a navy was a requirement as the "only instrument by which the nation can,
when emergencies arise, project its power beyond its shoreline. "10
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-Mahan emphasized the areas outlined earlier. He noted the importance ofupholding
the principles of the Monroe Doctrine from which the United States "could not recede
without the risk of national mortification." The movement toward building a canal through
Central America made the protection of this area even more critical to United States interests.
Mahan believed that United States policy "will always be defensive only" and that "we shall
seek to secure the peaceable solution of each difficulty as it arises."l1
As the leading naval authority of the time, and an advisor to Roosevelt himself, this
article is a good indicator ofthe official policy that existed in naval circles in the United States
at the turn ofthe century. The importance of the Caribbean region and the Monroe Doctrine
are apparent. The defensive nature of these policies are also clear, and resulted in ship
designs better suited to operation in the Caribbean and coastal waters than on the high seas.
As the navy did not anticipate initiating a conflict, it had no need for warships with the
capability to strike at an enemy overseas.
The writing of contemporary United States naval officers demonstrates how deeply
ingrained Mahan's ideas were. Writing in 1896, United States Navy Lieutenant John M.
Ellicott addressed the issue of foreign policy. In the first paragraph of his article "The
Composition of the Fleet," Ellicott placed the Monroe Doctrine as the first consideration.
The author believed that a permanent naval building program was a necessity for the
protection ofthe western hemisphere. To defend its interests, the United States "must have
a powerful fleet, and until we build it we are in daily jeopardy of national humiliation by
seeing some strong foreign power deliberately ignore our doctrine." Ellicott described the
"permanent foreign policy" of the United States as having three aspects: to prohibit
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-acquisition oftenitory by foreign powers in the Americas, «to protect American citizens the
world over," and finally, "non-interference in disputes between nations on other continents."
He was adamant that the United States would "never attempt the invasion of transoceanic
territory belonging to another nation.,,12
Ellicott's article confirms that naval policy had determined the range of United States
battleships. He believed that the most dangerous enemies of the United States were
overseas. Contemporary naval policy would "compel them to send their battle-ships
thousands of miles to attack us where we can fight them within easy reach of our own ports."
As such, the Navy "can dispense with some coal endurance in our line-of-battle ships and
leave room to make them in other respects superior fighting machines to those of the
adversary." The fact that Ellicott advocated the building of many monitors, vessels only
suited to use within harbors, only further displays the defensive nature of United States naval
policy.
Mahan added another contribution to the literature in 1897. In "Preparedness for
Naval War," Mahan reemphasized the importance of the Monroe Doctrine in foreign policy.
The United States had committed itself to "resort to force, if necessary, to prevent the
territorial or political expansion ofEuropean power beyond its present geographical limits in
the American continents." Mahan believed that the United States was not militaristic and was
"indisposed to aggression." Mahan wanted an increase in naval building due to increasing
United States commercial interests throughout the world. He advocated the building of more
armored cruisers, the favored vessel for this task. The main power of the navy would remain
as the battle fleet, stationed in territorial waters to defend the country. Mahan concluded that
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-"even coast defense ... , although essentially passive, should have an element ofoffensive
force, local in character." This localized power was the main battle fleet of United States
battleships. 13
Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainwright's "Our Naval Power," published early
in 1898, continues Mahan's arguments. Wainwright's concern was that the United States
defenses were inadequate to cover the extensive coastlines, leaving much ofboth the Atlantic
and Pacific seaboards open to attack. He noted that in shipping trade, the United States had
few vessels operated in foreign trade but "a very large tonnage engaged in the coastwise
trade." As such, United States interests "do not demand protection far from our shores."
This article stresses the defensive nature of United States planning. Wainwright wrote that
"The policy of our country is not an aggressive one, we only require armed forces for the
protection of our country and its interests." This included the Monroe Doctrine, which
recognized that "the strong United States is responsible for the protection of the weaker
American states." It was imperative to Wainwright that the United States "have command of
the Caribbean sea," especially for the proposed construction of the "Nicaraguan" canal. The
canal would allow rapid concentration of the fleet in either the Atlantic or the Pacific if war
threatened. 14
This naval policy was followed by the United States Navy throughout the period in
question and and the most telling proof of this are the results. The United States established
a preeminence in the Caribbean that was unmatched by any foreign power. After the
Venezuelan blockade, Germany never again returned to the Caribbean. Even more
importantly, England abandoned its fleet operations in the region also. 15 As Livennore and
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-Langley have found, the United States naval manuevers during the Venezuelan blockade
proved that the United States was the dominant power in the region and this was the result
of the naval building program that created the fleet.
The navy began to expand as the need for more vessels was apparent. Congress
authorized three new vessels of the Illinois class in 1896. These ships were notable in their
departure from the heavy secondary annament of eight-inch caliber, resorting to more six-
inch rapid-fire weapons. The Spanish-American war marked the beginning of an increase in
naval expenditures, with Congress providing for the construction of three new battleships
similar in construction to the Illinois class. The removal of the heavy secondary armament
ofeight-inch guns was not popular within the navy because this armament had proven itself
of great use in actual combat. When Congress approved the construction of five more
battleships ofthe Virginia class in 1900, three were to carry eight of these eight-inch weapons
in the four-turret configuration. The other two were to carry four eight-inch guns
superimposed on the main turrets and two twin turrets on each broadside amidships. All
eleven of these warships had similar specifications to those that distinguished the earlier
battleships. These battleships were almost equal in draft, freeboard, and endurance and
carried the heavy armor plating that characterized American design. The Virginia class had
an increase in displacement from eleven-thousand tons to almost fifteen-thousand tons, but
the basic architecture differed little from prior models. Coastal defense was the priority and
modifications for fighting in the open ocean or for overseas duty did not occur. 16
It was not until 1903, in the aftermath of the Venezuelan crisis, that the United States
changed its policies to expand the reach of the navy. The building of the Panama Canal and
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-the new "American Empire" was the main impetus behind these changes. Theorists began to
see that United States battleships had to operate at distances farther from our coast than they
had previously done. When the Connecticllt class of six vessels began construction in 1903,
they were the first seagoing battleships the country built. They had the high freeboard and
displacement typical of the most modem British vessels. Instead of the superior armor and
heavier gun installations that had characterized the earlier United States ships, the new
battleships were roughly equal to the foreign models. The fuel capacity was much greater and
the implication was that the United States would employ these new warships for more wide-
ranging missions. This resulted from the need to protect the Panama canal and interests in
the territories gained from Spain. The national interest no longer confined itself to the coast
of the country proper, but extended to the Caribbean, Alaska, Hawaii, and the Philippines.
As the scope of United States policy broadened, so was the range of United States
battleships, with a corresponding alteration in the design of these vesselsY
For more than ten years, the policies of the United States governed the construction
of battleships. The shallow draft and the corresponding lower freeboard made these ships less
efficient in the open sea than foreign competitors. It did allow these vessels to use and
protect the shallow harbors that occupied the coastline. These ships were far superior on the
defense and carried a much heavier battery than contemporaries. The main armament of the
first United States battleships, the Indiana class, is identical in form to the COlmecticut class
of 1903. Even the ships produced in the aftennath of the Spanish-American war demonstrate
no change in the perceived needs of the navy. The adherence to the similarity in design of
these ships is a clear indication ofa continuance in the policies that justified their construction.
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-The elements of this policy were those defined by Mahan. Coastal defense was the
primary mission ofthe battle fleet. The United States was opposed to aggression and did not
aspire to territorial conquest. The most important element of naval policy was the protection
of the Monroe Doctrine and the importance ofCaribbean to the security of the United States..
During the Spanish-American War, the two types of vessels adopted by the United
States Navy served American purposes well. Dewey's cruisers won a spectacular victory in
the Philippines. The navy confined the battleships to operations off the Cuban coast, in the
type ofwaters they were designed for and well within reach ofUnited States bases. During
the conflict, the long voyage of the battleship Oregon from San Francisco to operate off the
coast ofCuba proved that, ifnecessary, United States battleships were capable oflong-range
deployrnent. 18 It also demonstrated the advantage a canal through Central America would
be to the navy. Despite the Oregon's journey, the navy generally employed its vessels for
missions they were designed to perfonn.
The victory over Spain left many legacies that remained in 1902. The United States
Navy now had a core of officers and men who were combat experienced. Lessons from the
war were put into effect. A study found that only 3 percent of the shells fired by the United
States at Santiago Bay were hits. Gunnery training was placed as a priority and a 1902 article
proclaimed that "it is beyond question that the United States Navy makes much better
practice now than at any time in the course of the war with Spain."19 Santiago Bay proved
the complete inability ofeven the most modem European cruisers to stand up to the modem
United States battleships. It would be fruitless for any nation to attempt any kind of naval
venture against the United States in the Western Atlantic or Caribbean region without
46
including a main body ofpowerful battleships. A fleet composed of even the most powerful
armored cruisers would be quickly destroyed by the American battleships. The main batteries
of even the largest cruisers would not penetrate the armor of the American ships and the
armor of the cruisers would not withstand even the eight-inch fire of the battleships, to say
nothing of the 13-inch main batteries. As a result of the war, the United States also gained
possession of two naval bases strategicany located in the Caribbean.
During the period of naval buildup prior to the Venezuelan blockade of 1902, the
United States shaped the policies and actions that the Roosevelt administration took during
the crisis. The first and foremost was the growing importance of the Monroe Doctrine in
foreign policy. Any actions at all by European countries in the Western Hemisphere
immediately came under scrutiny by the United States government as wen as by the press.
The new push for the Panama Canal made the Caribbean that much more important to United
States policy makers. Their greatest fear, whether real or imagined, was that some foreign
power would gain territory in the region that would pose a threat to the canal. They realized
a naval power, such as Germany, could actually pose a threat to United States interests if they
possessed a coaling station in the West Indies. The Caribbean was a source of great anxiety
for the United States. The United States did not realize that their position in the region,
militarily, was virtually unassailable by any European power other than England. With a
modem fleet perfectly suited to defend the region, strategically placed coaling stations, and
short lines ofcommunication and supply, the United States was poised to establish supreme
control over the entire region.
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CHAPTER IV
GERMAN BATTLESHIP CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES
On paper, the United States and Gennan fleets of 1902 were almost equal. in strength.
However, Germany was not superior or equal to the United States in naval power. In
actuality, the German battleships ofthe period were inferior to the United States' vessels in
every aspect, from armor to annament. To challenge the United States in the Caribbean,
battleships were a necessity. Yet the German battleships also lacked the range to cross the
Atlantic and operate in the Caribbean without logistical support that was not at Germany's
disposal.
To assess the military threat that Germany posed to the United States in 1902, an
appraisal of the actual strength of the German fleet and its capabilities is necessary. In actual
numbers of ships, Germany was theoretically almost equal to the United States in naval
power. Germany constructed warships, especially the battleships, to fit a specific strategic
doctrine, and were limited in size by dockyard facilities and the size of the Kaiser Wilhelm
canal. These vessels were very well suited to the missions that German builders desi.gned
them for, but their deficiencies were many. The German battle fleet of 1902 was almost
completely incapable of deployment in the western Atlantic or Caribbean, and if it had
managed to find its way to the region, the vastly superior ships of the United States fleet
would have had a tremendous advantage over the German navy.
Gennany constructed its first modem battleships from 1890 to 1904. The four ships
of the Brandenburg class were roughly comparable in size to British designs of the same
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period, dispJacing 10,000 tons. The main armament of six II-inch guns was sup rior to that
ofmost other warships. At a time when most battleships carried two twin-turrets, these ship
carried three twin-turrets. These vessels carried a very light secondary battery of4. 1- and
3.5- inch guns. Designers gave armor protection a high priority. A full length annor belt was
fitted, at the expense of coal storage. As a result, these battleships bad a limited cruising
range of 4,500 miles at ten knots. 1
Figure 3. Kaiser Class Battleship
The next five battleships produced, between 1895-1902, were a major departure from
the earlier models. The Kaiser class (see figures 3 and 4) vessels displaced 11,000 tons, but
carried a significant reduction in main armament. These ships carried the standard two twin-
turrets and smaller guns of 9.4 inches. The secondary armament was upgraded to fourteen
6 inch guns. Germany heavily armored these ships, again at the cost of range, which fen to
3,000 miles at ten knots. 2
In 1899, Germany embarked upon a naval building program that called for a
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systematic building of warships, including a fleet of thirty-eight battleships. The rhetoric of
the Kaiser promoted the idea of making Germany a world power in the manner of England.
It was true that German economic influence was spreading throughout the world. By 1900,
Gennany was second only to England in foreign investment. The Kaiser maintained that the
only means ofprotecting these interests was the possession ofa powerful fleet, and Germany
intended to possess one. 3
However, despite the rhetoric, Germany did not follow accepted practices in building
her "colonial" navy. For this type of naval policy, the preferred type ofvessel was the long-
range cruiser. Maintaining a pretext of building a fleet for overseas use, Germany intended
the navy only for deployment in the North Sea. As Admiral von Tirpitz, the designer of the
Gennan Naval plan, explained to Kaiser Wilhelm: "a thorough-going cruiser war and a war
on the high seas against England and other great States is altogether excluded by our lack of
foreign bases and by Germany's geographical situation." Tirpitz called for building a "battle
fleet which can be stationed between Heligoland and the Thames." The German fleet had one
objective: to challenge England for control of the North Sea. 4
Much of the oratory about protecting overseas possessions was nothing but an
ilJusion. Germany did pursue an aggressive colonial policy overseas, but its naval planning
differed. Colonial expansion was simply a convenient excuse to justify a huge naval buildup.
Peter Padfield notes that "It was simple to argue that the German Navy had not kept pace
with the great increases in German overseas trade because it was true." What was hard was
trying to relate these interests to battleships "as trade defence was linked in most minds with
cruisers.,,5 As Tirpitz opined: "For political reasons ... one cannot directly say that the naval
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expansion is aimed primarily against England."6
Tirpitz believed that the foundation of naval power rested with a battle fleet. Since
this was incomplete, Germany "could not move with any freedom upon the seas of the world
and demand equal rights." Germany was "compelled by the threats of the British in the first
decade ofthis century to concentrate our fleet in force in home waters." Tirpitz further notes
that "trans-Atlantic expeditions, such as the China Campaign, the action against Venezuela
or the Agadir affair seemed ... altogether undesirable until the battle fleet was completed.
Only when the German fleet reached parity with that ofBritain were such overseas operations
warranted. 7
Certain aspects ofthe German naval building plan bear consideration. The first is the
idea of the "risk" fleet. This resembles the idea of deterrence that dominated Cold War
strategy. The Germans did not delude themselves into thinking that they could build and
maintain a fleet as large as that ofGreat Britain. Yet, the fleet had to be large enough to pose
a threat to the English fleet. By attacking the German fleet, the English might win, but such
a confrontation would so injure them that they no longer would be the leading sea power.
Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz eventually set the standard at a navy three-fifths the size of that
of the Royal Navy. This would be no larger than would be "necessary to make an attack on
us seem a hazardous undertaking even to the greatest sea-power." This fleet would prevent
a war from occurring by its existence alone. The English would never risk their control of the
seas, upon which they built their empire, to fight the German fleet. In this manner, Gennany
built its battle fleet to fight on the defensive. The battle fleet wa-s "never intended for war on
the high seas, but solely for the defence of home waters."g
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-Another important part of the fleet-building plan was the creation of what Tirpitz
termed "alliance value." Tirpitz writes that "a respectable fleet would also increase our
qualifications as an ally." He judged it possible to break the English monopoly of the world's
oceans by two methods, the "luck ofbattle" and "by means ofalliances." Thus, Tirpitz placed
a high priority on establishing an alliance with another sea power opposing the English.
Tirpitz believed that "Gennan trade. . . could no longer be protected by flying squadrons; we
had to increase in general power . . . to qualify ourselves for an alliance with the great
powers. " In 1919, Tirpitz lamented the failure of German diplomacy to achieve this goal:
"one single ally worth mentioning would have been of decisive influence" during the war9
German shipyards built battleships to match the policies of Tirpitz. The result was a
navy that was extremely capable in a confrontation limited to the North Sea between Germany
and England, but not well suited for long-range deployment. They were very seaworthy
vessels, having good freeboard and a typical draft of 26-27 feet. These ships were typically
smaller than the contemporaries in other navies, with a corresponding decrease in armament,
due to the limitations ofGerman shipyards and the size of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal at Kiel.
The Wittelsbach class (see figure 5) offive battleships was begun in 1899 and differed
little from the Kaiser class. The displacement of this class was a bit larger, 12,000 tons, but
the armament of9.4-inch guns was retained. Their size was still some 2,000 tons smaller than
contemporary battleships of other countries. This was typical ofGerman battleships during
the pre-Dreadnought period, mainly due to the constraints imposed by existing German
dockyard facilities. lO One journal of the period describes the Wittelsbach class: "Owing to
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Figure 4 ION Kaiser Wilhelm IJ
their relatively small displacement the ships have ... their compensating disadvantage, and
this is their small coal supply." By limiting coal supplies, these ships were more than adequate
in speed and armor. Gennan designers also incorporated higher freeboard than in vessels of
foreign design, which made them particularly well-suited to the waters of the North Sea.
There was no mistaking the purpose of these warships, they were "coast defence ships"
intended for short-range North Sea operations and not trans-oceanic excursions. I I Only one
of these latest vessels, the Wittelsbach, would be completed by the time of the Venezuelan
crisis in December 1902, having undergone trials in October of that year. J2
Subsequent development of German battleship design increased the main armament
to four II-inch guns and saw the operational range extend to over 6,000 miles at 10 knots.
These later vessels had sufficient range to cover the distance between the Caribbean and
Germany and back again, the distance being approximately 3,000 miles, but these vessels
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were still only in development at the time of the Venezuelan blockade and were in many ways.
still inferior to contemporary United States battleships.13
Two other aspects of German battleship design were detrimental to long range
deployment. One was the provision for survivability in combat. Tirpitz wrote that "The
supreme quality of a ship is that it should remain afloat, and. by preserving its vertical
position, continue to put up a fight." To achieve this goal, German shipbuilders adopted the
practice of building many watertight compartments below the waterline. This was the
standard practice ofall the countries building modem warships at this time, but Germany went
even further than others. Where other countries had watertight doors installed to interconnect
these compartments, German shipbuilders completely dispensed with these. While this proved
extremely valuable in combat during World War One, it was an extreme inconvenience to the
crews. It was hard to get around below decks and the ventilation was horrible. 14
The second factor that detracted from long-range use was the fact the designers had
incorporated the fuel supply into the protection ofthe battleship. German testing showed that
the effect of an explosive shell "was nullified if we compelled it to pulverize coal in any
considerable quantity. This resulted in a special arrangement of a portion of our coal
bunkers." Coal bunkers were placed in areas where the armor belt was thin, which would
greatly reduce the damage recieved if a shell burst in the area. 15 On short missions in the
Nortb Sea, this arrangement would prove useful. As the range increased, as on a trans-
Atlantic voyage, these coal supplies would eventually be drawn upon, actually weakening the
protection of the ship.
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Figure 5 IGN Schwaben (Wiltelsbach Class)
The German Navy, like the United States Navy, designed its warships for a defensive
mission. Theoretically, Gennan battleships could be adapted to other missions. They were
better ocean-going vessels than United States' designs, due to the higher freeboard, but an
attack by the Gennan fleet on the western Atlantic or Caribbean was unlikely, if not
impossible at this time. However, American war plans, right up to the First World War,
counted on Gennany attacking across the Atlantic. Clearly, the United States consistly
overrated Gennan naval capability.16
John Maurer writes: "The technological constraints of refueling in this era provided
limits on the capability of the Gennan battle fleet." The German fleet could not complete a
voyage to American waters without refueling. American planners believed that Germany
would have to refuel at the Azores and once again when they reached American waters.
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Germany's greatest weakness was its lack of a coaling station in the Caribbean region. In
order to refuel, Germany would either have to rely on Great Britain or bring enough colliers
along to resupply the fleet. They would still require a sheltered location in order to transfer
coal, which would have proved problematic with the United States Navy deployed to scout
out the Gennan Fleet. 17
These technical restraints clearly ruled out deployment of the Gennan Battle fleet to
the Caribbean. At the time ofthe Venezuelan Blockade, relations between the United States
and Great Britain were such that Gennany could not count on England's aid in replenishing
their fuel supplies. Creating a vast fleet train to bring their supplies with them would have
been a logistical nightmare. In 1912, it was estimated that the German Battle Fleet would
require 97 colliers to supply its fleet in the event of an attack on the United States. 18 The
United States fleet could defeat the entire plan by simply destroying the colliers intended to
supply the battle fleet. Much of the second line of the German fleet would have to deploy
in defense of the fleet train, weakening the scouting force needed to spot the enemy battle
fleet as it approached, as well as decreasing the support of secondary units to the main Battle
Fleet.
Even in the unlikely event that the German fleet did manage to cross the Atlantic,
more problems would have to be overcome. The first was the superiority of the United
States' Navy in weaponry. On paper, the two fleets were nearly identical in 1902. According
to a Gennan Study, the United States had 20 battleships compared to the German 19. The
disparity in large cruisers was greater, the United States holding a 16 to 11 advantage.
However, only five of the German cruisers could be classified as modern (built after 1887)
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-and 13 of the United States vessels were of modem construction. 19
The 20 to 19 ratio in battleships is also deceiving, as the United States' vessels were
vastly superior in firepower. The 9.4-inch guns of the latest German battleships were only
slightly bigger than the secondary 8-inch weapons carried by many of the United States
battleships. The 13-inch main armament of the United States' vessels dwarfed the smaller
German weapon. The 8-inch secondary guns of the United States' battleships were capable
of penetrating the armor belt of the German vessels, while the 6-inch guns of the German
warships were inadequate against the more heavily armored enemy.20
Another difficulty for Germany was the actual strategic position of the United States
in the Caribbean. Where the Germans had no bases in the region, the United States did have
bases as a result of the Spanish-American War. Advanced bases were available to the United
States fleet at Cuba and Puerto Rico. The United States had built its battleships to fight on
the defense and a Gennan attack in the Caribbean was exactly the type ofaction anticipated
when these vessels were designed. United States battleships would have the advantage of
fighting in home waters, short lines of communication and supply, and also the added
advantage of the lesser draft, allowing them to retreat into harbors that the Germans could
not use ifnecessary. The German fleet would be fighting a war it was not designed to fight,
in waters it was never intended to fight in, against an enemy that held every strategic and
tactical advantage. Such a foray by the German fleet would have been highly improbable.
No country would risk their fleet, and thereby their national security, on a venture that was
almost sure to end in failure. It is a certainty that the United States did not have to fear any
action by the Gennan Battlefleet at this point in time.
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-The evidence presented in this chapter make a good case for the arguments proposed
by Vagts. He claims that the fear of Germany was created by Roosevelt and other pro-navy
supporters to gain support for further naval funding, which Congress had turned down in
1901. American writers clearly overrated or intentionally misrepresented Germany's naval
strength for many years. A simple comparison of the statistics of American and German
battleships in Jane's Battleships of the 20th CenturY} demonstrate the decisive edge the
United States ships had over contemporary German vessels. To claim that Gennan naval
power was superior to the United States' in 1902, as Mitchell does, plainly ignores the facts.
The fact that Germany was not superior to the United States actually supports Mitchell's
assessment that Germany was being cautious throughout the affair. It is very convincing
evidence that Germany was not after territorial gain, because it had no way of supporting such
a move militarily.
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-CHAPTER V
THE QUESTION OF INTENT
Alfred Vagts, in Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten in der Weltpo/itild, has
done an exhaustive search ofGerman archives and found no evidence of any German designs
on Venezuelan territory during the 1902-1903 blockade. Throughout the blockade, and
before, Germany did its utmost to assure the United States that this was the case. This study
has shown that Germany lacked sufficient naval strength to establish and support such a base
in the Caribbean. American military strength in the region was supreme and growing
stronger. 2 Vagts goes into great detail denying the Roosevelt narrative and defending
Germany from the charges ofterritorial ambition. He says little about Germany's actual intent
in the crisis. In this account, Germany was only after the collection of debts. Mitchell
believes that more emphasis needs to be placed on German intent in the blockade; she thinks
that better Anglo-German relations were the goal. German actions in the crisis point to a
different direction. In fact, the major member of the alliance, England, also had different
motivations in the Venezuelan blockade. The stated purpose of the action was debt collection
but this might have proved a convenient cover for both England and Germany to achieve
other ends.
By comparing the strengths and weaknesses of both the United States and German
Navies and the policies that governed the building ofthese fleets, it is certain that neither fleet
had any cause to worry about attack from the other's battleships. Both sides lacked the range
necessary to threaten the other's homeland and each country's ships had certain deficiencies
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that would prove detrimental ifthey had attempted such a feat. The deep draft of the German
vessels would limit their usefulness in the western Atlantic/Caribbean and the slower speed
and low freeboard ofthe United State's battleships would severely hamper operations in the
North Sea. As the primary mission of both navies was defense of their homelands, overseas
operations were unlikely.
German naval planning did not rule out future use of the fleet for colonial expansion.
Perceptions of the German fleet varied on both sides of the Atlantic. The Germans thought
in long-range terms. They did not intend the naval building program to catch up with the rest
of the world overnight. The fulfillment of the plan was not to be complete until after a
twenty-year period, when the first new battleships would be completed to replace the old
ones. This would create a cycle of building that would be set down by law and not open to
scrutiny by government bureaucrats. Not until this process was complete did Tirpitz envision
embarking on imperialist missions. Germany then could use long-range cruisers, in the
manner ofEngland, to establish its wiD around the globe. The threat of the battle fleet would
prohibit any country, even Great Britain, from interfering with German plans.·'
Theodore Roosevelt viewed the growing German fleet as an immediate threat, a
feeling shared by many others. Admiral Tirpitz noted that by "the year 1900 it was universally
felt that Germany was about to take the unavoidable step towards a world-policy and to send
her flag after her trade as closely as possible." Yet, the Reichstag had turned down the
cruisers targeted for foreign service use in 1900. Tirpitz himself declared that he would have
"preferred the whole of the foreign-service fleet to be canceled in 190011 to divert funds to
building battleships. 4
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In the United States the fear ofGennany was very real. As mentioned earlier, the
Monroe Doctrine had become central to United States foreign policy. Americans viewed the
Caribbean as an area critical to the national interest, and as the Panama Canal project moved
closer to implementation, the United States became more detennined to uphold the doctrine.
The Spanish-American war of 1898 had ousted one European power from the region and the
United States had no desire to allow any new powers to gain access to the Caribbean.
When the Venezuelan crisis began, leaders in the United States began to see a threat
to the Monroe Doctrine. The first sign oftrouble resulted from the sinking of the Venezuelan
warships. Colorado Senator Henry M. Teller wanted the United States to intervene in the
situation. He believed that "the Monroe Doctrine ought to be extended to prevent the
oppression ofany ofthe South American nations by a foreign power and that we should not
draw the line upon the acquisition ofterritory.,,5 Senator Cullom, head of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, warned "Ifthe troops of the allies should start overland ... I should deem
it the duty of this Government promptly to call a halt on the ground that this would have all
the appearance of first steps in the permanent acquisition ofterritory.,,6
Territorial conquest was not a primary goal ofGennany in the Venezuelan crisis. The
Germans knew, as the English did, that the United States had fleet maneuvers going on in the
Caribbean at this time, which included both the North and South Atlantic squadrons and the
Mediterranean Squadron as well. Germany had only four ships in the blockade, a second-
class cruiser, two third-class cruisers, and a gunboat. The modem battleships and cruisers
of the combined United States fleet would have quickly overwhelmed the assembled fleet of
Britain, Germany, and Italy (which had two cruisers participating in the blockade).
65
,....
Occupying territory would definitely have brought the United States fleet into the region in
protection of the Monroe Doctrine. On December 19, the London Times reprinted a semi-
official statement from the Cologne Gazette that said that "Germany has no more idea of
seizing tracts of territory in Venezuela than of planting her flag on the mountains of the
moon." They recognize that "any such step would be bound sooner or later to lead to a
collision with the United States." They cite the fact that Germany was not increasing its naval
forces nor making preparations to land ground forces as proof of this claim. 7
Gennany did not attempt to expand its forces in the region. If they planned to grab
territory, they needed troops to secure their gains. The ships involved did not have enough
manpower to capture and hold even a small part of Venezuelan territory. The Panther, for
instance, had a crew of only 130 officers and men. The German cruisers carried about the
same.8 When the Germans captured the Venezuelan gunboats, they could spare no men for
prize crews and this is why the vessels were sunle If the Germans could not manage to spare
a few men to crew these captured vessels, they did not have any to spare to capture any base
in Venezuela. IfGermany had planned to take and hold territory, it would have had to supply
troops from Germany to accomplish this task.
In 1902, Germany was not prepared for this type of operation. Amphibious doctrine
was an idea ofthe future. In 1902, the method used to transport troops to foreign shores was
that used by the United States in the Spanish-American War. They embarked troops in
whatever transport was available, moved to the target area and rowed ashore in wooden
boats. This worked well when the landings were unopposed, but Germany could be assured
that the United States would not idly stand by while they landed troops in Venezuelan
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-tenitory. The presence ofthe entire United States fleet in the Caribbean at this time virtually
guaranteed opposition to any such move.
In the past, Germany had experienced problems with this sort of troop deployment.
Gennany had sent 24,000 troops to China during the occupation ofKaiochow, a move that
Admiral Tirpitz opposed. The admiral was extremely critical of the "bungling preparations
for the miserable China Expedition" and "the deficient materiel and defective mental
qualifications ofthe Army administration" in matters not concerning a European ground war.9
It was unlikely that Germany would attempt such an expedition to Venezuela with the existing
United States naval superiority in the region.
Germany never contemplated sending troops. This would have required the
mobilization of transports and warships to support such a move. At the very beginning of the
blockade, Germany determined not to mobilize any more vessels for use in the action. On
December 12, they decided that "from a political point of view a further increase of the
blockading squadron appears undesirable." The Kaiser stated "I am against sending more of
our ships from home! Our flag is represented, so let us leave England to take the first step. "10
Wary of American sensitivity, Germany was not going to risk starting a war with them by
sending even a few more warships.
Another possible explanation for German intentions in the blockade is the stated
purpose of the mission. Perhaps the Germans were really after the collection of overdue
debts. This also seems doubtful considering the actions taken by Germany during the crisis.
Only a few days after the blockade began, all of the interested powers agreed to arbitration
to settle the debt problem. If debt collection was the purpose, then this should have ended
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-the joint action against Venezuela. However, Germany prolonged the blockade for months
by demanding immediate payments that the Venezuelan Government could not afford. II
It is highly unlikely that the German government would have kept up the costly naval
operations in the Caribbean ifmonetary reparation had been the goal. As the earlier examples
of German diplomacy of this period show, the Kaiser's government was extremely
opportunistic, and would use any event to their benefit. Yet, a military expedition to
Venezuela was out ofthe question at this time because of the limitations of the German navy.
Germany ostensibly embarked upon the blockade for the recovery of monetary obligations
as did England. Yet debt collection was really only a secondary goal ofboth governments.
[n January 1903, Admiral Charles Bereford of the British Royal Navy commented on
the Anglo-Gennan alliance: "No sensible person believed that Germany and England started
out to settle a debt. It was an attack on the Monroe Doctrine. England and Germany had an
idea that they had a grievance with Venezuela. No doubt they had, but the situation was
absurd." 12 Although not an official statement, there is probably some truth behind the words.
The main grievance the British had with Venezuela had nothing to do with debts, but
with the seizure of British-owned vessels by the Venezuelan navy. Trouble began over the
rights to Patos Island, which Great Britain had claimed from Venezuela in 1901, in direct
violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Venezuela did not recognize English sovereignty over the
island and Castro's gunboats frequented the waters off Patos harassing British Vessels.
England wanted to destroy the Venezuelan navy and debt collection was just an excuse to
accomplish this mission.
These events began in January 1901, the Venezuelan gunboat Augusto "seizing and
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-deporting certain British Subjects." The seizure of the English vessels Buena Fe, Maria
Teresa, Pastor, Indiana and In Time followed this incident. 13 In the most flagrant case a
Venezuelan warship captured the Queen, on a voyage to Trinidad, and confiscated her papers
and sails on "a bare suspicion of having carried a cargo of arms to Venezuela." The
Venezuelan Ship then destroyed the ship, "the crew being put on shore and left destitute."14
The British wanted Venezuela to cease all such activity and to pay reparations to the
owners ofthe ships in question. It was almost an afterthought that claims owed to the British
Railway Companies were added to the list of grievances. IS When Germany defined the
grievances ofboth parties to the blockade, it listed England's primary or "first-class" claims
as resulting from "the illegal removal and destruction ofEnglish merchant-ships." It listed
the demands of the English railways as "second-dass" claims. 16 However, the English
government was careful not to qualify its demands to Venezuela, although the British
acknowledged that the claims for destruction of its shipping were the first priority. Great
Britain hoped that the seizure of the Venezuelan gunboats would prove the end of the affair
and that no blockade would prove necessary. 17 By December 16, the British press was
already calling for arbitration, even before receiving the news ofCastro's proposal. From that
point on, Gellnany feared that England might desert the alliance. IS Great Britain had achieved
its main objective with the capture and destruction of the Venezuelan gunboats. This is why
England accepted arbitration more readily than Germany. The gunboats were the aim and
intent ofEngland in the Venezuelan blockade. This would end Venezuela's ability to harass
British vessels on the high seas and to interfere with the territorial claims on Patos Island.
The debt collection was not that critical an issue with Great Britain. The capture of
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the warships had spurred Castro to action, in referring the case to the United States for
arbitration. England and its investors could expect some sort of arrangement to be
forthcoming. This was the goal from the beginning and the British achieved this aim within
a few days. Great Britain was forced to continue the action because of the arrangement with
Germany to seek no separate peace.
As far as debts, Gennany did have some outstanding claims against Venezuela. Count
Paul von Metternich, Ambassador to England, listed the claims from the Venezuelan civil war
of 1898-1900 at 1,700,000 bolivares, from the ongoing civil war at the time at 3,000,000
bolivares and the claims of creditors, primarily the Disconto Gesellscha.ft at 41,000,000
bolivares. 19 The total debt was equal to approximately 55,400,000 marks. 20 This was a
tremendous amount of money in 1902. Thus, German claims against Venezuela were
justified.
However, reasons still exist to suspect that Germany had other motivations. In March
1902, the Kaiser's brother, Prince Henry, visited the United States. Chancellor von Bolow
advised the Prince that "The events in South and Central America should not be discussed by
Your Royal Highness of your own initiative, and naturally there must be no admission of
German intentions in those regi.ons." Any American worries over "acquisition or influence
in connection with Central or South America ... should be dismissed as absurd imaginings. "21
When these comments are added to the statements of Admiral Bereford cited above, German
intentions become suspect.
Two other facts raise suspicion about German intent. The first is the cost of the
enterprise. Venezuela owed Germany some fifty-five million marks, but the Kaiser estimated
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-the cost ofthe military intervention (with just the four small vessels) as between fifty and sixty
million marks. 22 If the debts were really Germany s intention, surely there was a less
expensive way to recover the funds. The second item is the method employed. Germany was
asking for a repayment of debts, but the customs houses of the major ports were the
Venezuelan government's major source of income. The blockade effectively blocked all
traffic too and from these ports, making the repayment of debts impossible. 23 Territorial
acquisition was not feasible and debt collection a dubious claim. Germany must have had
other intentions in mind during the Venezuelan crisis.
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CHAPTER VI
GERMAN fNTENT IN THE BLOCKADE OF VENEZUELA, 1902-1903
Some reason exists to doubt German intentions during the Venezuelan crisis. As this
study shows, Germany was not capable oftaking territory at this time. In the work of Vagts
and Mitchell, Germany never contemplated such a move. Yet the high cost of the blockade
and the methods employed in enforcing it rules out debt collection as the only goal. Defining
German intent now becomes problematic. As Marks has discovered, critical pieces of the
German diplomatic record are missing from the period in question. No documentary evidence
of a systematic plan regarding the Venezuelan crisis exists. The argument over debt
collection and territorial expansion originated due to this lack of documentation. Historians
on both sides of the controversy have found much circumstantial evidence to disprove each
theory. What they have overlooked is a third possibility.
When Germany and England allied to blockade Venezuela in December 1902, it was
a strange partnership. Theodore Roosevelt believed that "such a combination would be one
of utmost folly for England, because she is certain to have her paws burned, while the nuts
would go to Germany."] As Roosevelt predicted, the British would encounter problems from
this alliance, which, as this study will argue, was the intention of the Germans from the
beginning.
Germany's strategy was to downplay their role in the crisis, creating the appearance
that Great Britain initiated the action, was in charge of the whole affair, and was therefore at
fault ifany international repercussions were forthcoming. The Germans then began to employ
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-aggressive methods in enforcing the blockade, which the British did not agree with, designed
to arouse fears within the United States that the Monroe Doctrine was under attack.
Simultaneously, the Gennans tried to convince the British that the United States's diplomats
were intentionally trying to ruin relations between England and Germany.
Much conjecture exists over which country :first suggested the joint blockade. British
documents point to Germany as the instigator. In July 1902, the German ambassador to
England, Count Metternich, approached the British Prime Minister, the Marquis of
Lansdowne, and suggested a pacific blockade of Venezuela. Lansdowne agreed to confer
with Germany on the matter, but asked for time to consider the matter fully.2 There is no
doubt that Germany first considered the coercion of Venezuela and were prepared to proceed
on their own until the British joined them in the venture. 3
The main concern of Great Britain was its international Image. The English
government suggested that a seizure of the Venezuelan navy might be "the most convenient
form of coercion." Germany readily agreed but still advocated a blockade as well.
Lansdowne was concerned that a pacific blockade was not adequate for their purposes, while
"a belligerent blockade might involve us in troublesome questions with the powers." Great
Britain initially opposed any form of a blockade.4
Germany insisted on a blockade and approached the United States government to ask
if it had any objections to a pacific blockade. John Hay replied that Roosevelt had defined
the United States position in his annual message to Congress in 1901. Roosevelt stated that
the Monroe Doctrine only guaranteed "that there would be no territorial aggrandizement by
any non-American power on American soil." This policy "has nothing to do with the
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-commercial relations ofany American power" and the United States will not "guarantee any
State against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the
fonn ofthe acquisition of territory by any non-American power."s The Germans expressed
their concern to England that the United States "might raise di.fficulties if portions of
Venezuela remained occupied for some time." This is why they stressed a pacific blockade
over a warlike blockade. 6
The first element of the German plan was to tie the two allies together. Metternich
was adamant that each country, when presenting its ultimatum to Venezuela, should "call
attention to the claims put in by the other." Each party should agree that "neither
Government should be at liberty to recede except by mutual agreement." Later, this
agreement would prove troublesome for England as friction arose between the allies and
Britain wanted to end the action. England had to support the Germans although its actions
went against British policy, Germany bombarding Venezuelan forts and landing troops to
ensure their destruction. Any misdeeds that the Germans might commit implicated their
British allies7 On November 29, 1902, Germany repeated the joint nature of the blockade.
The German government "understood that the two powers were to act together until the
claims ofboth had been satisfied." The German Navy had moved four warships into position
off the Venezuelan coast and were meeting with the Royal Navy to coordinate operations.s
If the seizure of the Venezuelan warships did not prove sufficient to coerce
Venezuela, England held the conviction that only two other options were available, a "seizure
of customs houses or other important points on Venezuelan territory" or a blockade. The
British believed that they should avoid the first option at all costs, because if the occupation
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proved prolonged, "troublesome international questions might arise between the Powers
involved and the United States Government.,,9 Nor did Great Britain agree with th.e idea of
a pacific blockade. They felt that any blockade must necessarily be warlike in nature. They
saw a need to "come to an agreement with the Germans as to the explanations which each of
us might offer of the measures taken to enforce the blockade by the two powers." England
saw these "measures as implying a condition of war." Lansdowne was concerned that
Germany might "assert that we have misled them," and wanted to reach an agreement before
the opening of the blockade so that they could not "pretend that we have done so." These
fears were entirely justified.10
When the blockade took effect on December 9, 1902, the Germans began to use
aggressive tactics of enforcement. After the capture of the Venezuelan fleet, German
warships promptly sank two of the Venezuelan warships. On December 13, they joined in
a combined attack on two forts at Puerto Cabello. The German ships moved into close range
to ensure the destruction of the forts and their occupants. It was after these preliminary
actions that the first signs of trouble with the United States emerged. The Germans were
quick to point out to the United States that "Germany was at first inclined to a pacific
blockade, but that Great Britain insisted on establishing a warlike blockade." Germany also
claimed that "it had been the intention of Germany to confine the combined operations in
Venezuelan waters to a peaceful blockade" and it emphasized that "Great Britain had declined
a proposal to that end."ll Germany was attempting to place the blame for their own
aggression on the British.
While incriminating their allies, Germany was also trying to keep itself from looking
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bad. The Chancellor, von BOlow, was concerned that the Kaiser might send more warships
to enforce the blockade. He suggested that they rely solely on the four ships already
enforcing the blockade, believing that any increase might cause trouble with the United States.
Von Bolow urged that Germany also allow the British to "continue reinforcing her
squadrons" to alleviate some negative press "in the British and American press to the effect
that Germany was the chief instigator." This had the added bonus of making it appear that
Britain was leading the blockade by virtue of having a much larger fleet participating in the
action. 12
Mitchell writes that Germany followed the British lead throughout the crisis and was
very cautious in its handling of the United States and the Monroe Doctrine. 13 However, the
Germans continued to commit acts guaranteed to antagonize the United States. They landed
troops on Venezuelan territory and occupied buildings. On January 17, 1903, the German
fleet attacked the fort at Maracaibo. The British commander on the scene was greatly upset.
He cabled London: "German Commodore, acting quite independently and without consulting
either Montgomery or myself, appears to have commenced bombarding at Maracaybo. I
entirely disagree with his action." The British had ordered its ships not to "land men, nor
bombard forts, nor sink any ships" without direct orders from the Admiralty. The Germans
followed their own agenda, despite pledging to work with the British. The sinking of the
Venezuelan vessels, the landing of troops and occupation of Venezuelan property along the
independent shelling of the fort at Maracaibo proves that Gennany was not following the
British lead in any manner. 14
While practicing actions that could only arouse suspicion and anger from tbe United
78
States, Germany informed the British that they would stop creating problems for them. On
December 18, the German Government promised that they would "in future treatment of the
Venezuelan question, not do anything which might provide more 'ammunition' for use against
the British Government." Germany "would spare no efforts in order to dispel the false
impressions which had been created, and to disprove the calumnies which had been
circulated."ls The actions of their fleet, especially the bombardment ofMaracaibo in January,
were in direct opposition to this official statement. The British were enforcing the blockade;
the Germans clearly had more in mind. Possibly, the Germans saw the blockade as a chance
to bring down its main enemy, Great Britain, and create an opportunity to increase Germany's
international position by creating rift between England and the United States.
Germany could gain many benefits by splitting the United States and England. The
first would be to compel the United States to step up the building of its fleet. Admiral von
Tirpitz explains: "Every warship constructed anywhere in the world except in England was
ultimately an advantage for us because it helped to adjust the balance of power at sea."16 The
United States had stepped up construction ofbattleships after the Spanish-American war, but
Congress had voted down a further increase in 1901. If Germany could create a fear of
Britain in the United States, the Roosevelt administration would have no choice but to begin
a rapid build up of its fleet. This would weaken England's hold on the world's oceans,
exactly the result Germany wanted.
One of the main goals of Germany's naval plan was to gain an alliance value with
foreign navies. This was not an original concept to Tirpitz. The German Admiralty first
conceived the idea in the 1880's. In 1902, ofall the naval powers in the world, only one was
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not either anti-German or already allied with other powers: the United States. France was
a mortal enemy ofGennany. Russia might have been a possibility, but France had an alliance
with the Czar. Another growing power, Japan, had allied with Britain earlier in 1902. The
only major naval powers that an aUiance was possible with were the United States and
England. Germany had developed their naval bill to challenge England, so the United States
had to be the focus of the alliance efforts. It was the only major naval power that had no
alliances with any nation. Tirpitz's memoirs suggest that there was a prevailing hope within
Gennan leadership, which he did not necessarily subscribe to, that the United States might
become "a useful assistant to us against the British dictatorship ofthe seas.")?
If one key intention of the German naval plan was to create an alliance value, the
United States is the most probable target for such an combination. America had no alliances
with other European powers. When England had proposed an alliance with Germany in 190I,
the Kaiser turned it down. His first question was "against whom" and the reply was "Russia."
Wilhelm II refused to enter such a bargain, since Germany, on the continent and bordering
Russia, would face the brunt of the fighting in an event of a war while England, a naval
power, could do little to assist them. 18
Germany wanted a naval alliance. Existing alliances and the political situation of
Europe excluded all but the smaller nations, such as Denmark and Holland, from
consideration. These countries would be unable to alter the balance ofpower at sea in any
way. Only two naval powers had no ties to Europe in 1902, the United States and Japan.
Great Britain successfully negotiated a Japanese agreement in 1902. That leaves only one
possible naval power for Germany to ally with: the United States.
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Even if an alliance with the United States did not take form, the breakdown in Anglo-
American relations would create other possibilities in this area. Territorial gains in South
America were not out of the question for Germany later. The Monroe Doctrine only
remained intact throughout the 1800s by the good graces of the British. England had
unchallenged naval superiority throughout this period, as they did in 1902-1903. If they had
wanted to establish colonies in the Americas, the United States could not oppose them.
England had taken Patos Island in 190 I without a word of reproach from the United States.
Great Britain and the United States had come to an agreement on the Monroe Doctrine
because of the Venezuelan boundary dispute of 1895. The English had formally recognized
United States hegemony over the region, recognizing the validity of the Monroe Doctrine.
The rest ofEurope, Germany included, did not recognize the Monroe Doctrine. A
division between England and the United States would remove British support for the United
States policy. Germany would not have to fear intervention by the Royal Navy in any
colonization attempts. Germany could not lose if their plan succeeded. A split between
England and the United States would weaken the British diplomatically and militarily. Th If
the United States thought England was a threat, they would be forced to build more warships
for protection. The sheer size ofthe Royal Navy would have made it expedient for the United
States to seek naval alliances with foreign countries, which was Germany's hope. Even if
an alliance with the United States did not materialize, the action would open possibilities of
territorial gain in the Americas for Germany. While no direct evidence of a plan exists, the
reconstruction offered here fits well with German long-range goals and its actions during the
cnsls.
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However, Germany underestimated the suspicion with which the Americans and
British viewed them. The disputes beginning over the incident at Manila Bay during the
Spanish-American war had created problems between the United States and Germany that
they had never resolved. The United States viewed the Germans as trying to interfere with
their interests and the Venezuelan affair was no different. Britain was equally suspicious of
Germany, and the Boer war had left many with a firm hatred of the Germans. When the
British allied with Germany in the Venezuelan crisis, that action drew almost immediate
criticism from the British press and the public. In such an atmosphere, the German plan, if
plan there was, to undennine Anglo-American relations was sure to fail.
In the Venezuelan Crisis, the United States identified Germany as the threat
immediately. Sir Michael Herbert, the English Ambassador to the United States, wired
London that "there is a growing feeling of irritation in Congress . . . chiefly owing to the
bombardment and the sinking of Venezuelan ships." The Roosevelt administration was "not
suspicious ofus, but it is undoubtedly suspicious ofGerman designs. The impression prevails
in Washington that Germany is using US."19 The British press reported that the United
States's "Suspicions, anxiety, demands for the cessation ofnaval energies are, so far as they
exist, directed at Germany.,,20 One Gennan newspaper commented on the situation in the
United States: "The entire Press makes Germany responsible for the present situation.
Spiteful articles everywhere appear with attacks on Germany, while England is praised ...
all the papers assert that Germany intends to obtain colonies in Venezuela, as well as
Brazil.,,2l
Britain quickly moved to pacify the fears of the United States. On December 16, Lord
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Cranborne, a leading member of Parliament, gave his assurance that "no country is more
desirous than England to assist the American Government in maintaining the Monroe
Doctrine.,,22 Throughout the crisis, the English did not take any actions that were in any way
a threat to Venezuelan sovereignty. It was their allies, the Germans, who created the trouble
with the United States by testing the limits of the Monroe Doctrine. The English actions
relieved the United States. On December 29, Herbert wrote to Lansdowne: "It is perhaps
satisfactory to note the absence of apprehension about the course pursued by Great Britain
and the confidence universally expressed that she has no intenti.on ofquestioning the Monroe
doctrine." Herbert points out that statements by Lord Cranbome and the Prime Minister,
when added to the "outcry in the English Press against joint action with Germany" produced
in the United States "a revulsion of feeling in favour of Great Britain.,,23
When Venezuela appealed to the United States for arbitration of the dispute, the
United States quickly suggested this course of action to the Germany and England. Within
days of the outbreak, both powers had tentatively agreed to accept arbitration. The British
wanted to get out because they had achieved their aims, and Germany wanted to look good
internationally. Both agreed to submit to arbitration, but this action, iffulfilled, would upset
the plans of Germany. By stipulating that they would only accept arbitration if the
Venezuelan government paid them $325,000 immediately, they managed to prolong the
blockade. They knew that with the horrible financial state of Venezuela, President Castro
could not come up with this amount of money. The English, due to the promise that they
could not agree to terms separately from the Germans, were forced to continue the blockade
although they wanted it ended. 24
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By January 1903, German actions were producing the exact opposite of their apparent
intentions. Herbert wrote from Washington: "the outburst in this country against Germany
has been truly remarkable, and suspicion of the German Emperor's designs in the Caribbean
Sea is shared by the Administration, the press and the public alike." He contends that "the
friendly relations between Great Britain and the United States, instead of being impaired,
have, if anything, been strengthened by the Venezuelan incident." Not only was Germany
bringing together the two countries that they wanted to tear apart, but they were gaining an
increasingly bad reputation within both the United States and Britain as well. 2s
Rumors increased the ill-will against Germany. In December, the British press
reported that German ships were "loitering about the Island ofMargarita, which the Emperor
was once supposed to covet. ,,26 This was picked up and amplified in the United States, as
were the rumors that circulated in January that a group of German investors posed a threat
to the Panama canal project. These investors reportedly sought to "acquire Colombia's
interests in the Panama Canal Company"2? The German government quickly and vehemently
denied these reports, and no evidence exists to prove either charge. However, this did little
to quell the rising anti-German sentiment in the United States or Britain.
In at least two instances, commentary on the crisis correctly identified the German
plan. Sir Herbert, the British Ambassador, noted "the flattery lavished upon" the United
States by the Kaiser, and the "persistent attempts made by German Diplomacy to ... sow
dissension between great Britain and the United States.,,28 Similarly, the New York Herald
of December 16, 1902, which stated that "the 'wicked partner' in this affair is the German
Emperor." Increasing friendship between the United States and Great Britain "is the cause
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of great anxiety to the Kaiser." The real motive behind the attempts to improve German-
American relations were to "destroy that cordiality." To achieve this end, "the Emperor has
cajoled the British Government into acting with him.,,29
As the Gennan plan began to unravel, its government changed tactics. To show their
loyalty to the British as allies, Germany claimed that Venezuela had offered to make a
separate settlement with Germany before the blockade, but out ofhonor, Germany remained
loyal to the British. They claimed that this was an attempt by Venezuela to detach the
Germans from the allied cause. They then insisted that the British follow their obligation to
act in concert with the Germans. 30
Failing to incite the United States against England, Germany attempted to provoke
the English against the United States. Herbert Bowen, the United States Ambassador to
Venezuela, was responsible for making the arrangements for arbitration between the powers
and Venezuela. He became the focus of German accusations. On February 4, 1903,
Metternich infonned Landsdowne that "Bowen was apparently attempting to detach Germany
from [Great Britain] by holding out separate inducements to [the German] representative at
Washington." Germany would not "be influenced by these machinations, and would co-
operate loyally" with the British. 31
Apparently there was much truth to the accusations. Bowen helped the German cause
by admitting to the Italian Ambassador that "the main principle of his diplomacy was to create
discord" between Germany and England?2 On February 7, Lansdowne wrote that "Bowen's
object appears to be not to facilitate an equitable settlement but to create dissensions between
the powers." Yet the real problem was not Herbert Bowen but the Germans.
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Germany refused to retreat from its demands. They wanted payments that Venezuela
could not make. Ambassador Herbert wrote to London on February 7, 1903, that "a
settlement could be reached today if we were alone." The problem was the Gennan
conditions. He added that "Ifwe are bound to support the Gennan ... demands, which are,
in my opinion, unfair ... let Germany propose to break off negotiations, but do not let the
proposal come from Great Britain." Herbert felt that they had reached an impasse and that
negotiations were about to break down. The British wanted to end the blockade, but their
agreement bound them to stay in it until the end. 33
The United States and especially Theodore Roosevelt also wanted an end to the
blockade. This was clear to Herbert. He warned Lansdowne that conditions had changed
since December and "our good relations with this country will be seriously impaired if this
Alliance with Germany continues much longer. The time has come, in American opinion, for
us to make the choice between the mendship of the United States and that of Germany." If
Gennan planned to divide the countries, it still had some chance of succeeding, especially if
there was much more delay.34
Something drastic had to occur for the stalemate to be broken. Ambassador Herbert
was sure that no settlement was near on February 7, yet all three powers signed a protocol
on February 13, and they lifted the blockade on February 16. Gennany had altered its
position and backed off on its demands. During that week, something of significance had
influenced German thinking. This, as some historians have pointed out, was the most likely
moment for Theodore Roosevelt's alleged ultimatum.
The most enduring puzzle of the Venezuelan crisis is this supposed threat to the
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Germans. As noted earlier, Roosevelt's version has problems, because Germany readily
agreed to arbitration when tbe United States proposed it in December. It was at that point
that they stipulated the large payment from Venezuela as a prerequisite. Arbitration was not
the problem that created the stalemate in negotiations, rather it was Germany's stem refusal
to back down on its monetary claims. Germany hurriedly dropped its claims during the week
of February 7-13,1903. IfRoosevelt did threaten the Germans with the United States fleet,
it was surely at this time and not in December.
Another possibility would be that Germany feared that Britain might turn against
them. Popular opinion in England had been against the alliance from the beginning.
Lansdowne had held fast to his alliance agreement, but in February, Germany worried that
Lansdowne might be in trouble with public opinion at home. Mettemich wrote to von Bulow
that any further deterioration in relations between England and the United States "may be
dangerous for him and his ministry." Metternich believed that if Roosevelt insisted on an end
to the blockade, "the British Government might fall at once. A fresh ministry, replacing the
present one as a result of having co-operated with Germany, would mean a serious danger
to official Anglo-German relations. "35 Germany wanted to challenge British superiority at
sea, but now was not the time. Their naval building program had barely begun, and Germany
wanted to avoid open hostility with England. The realization that any agreement with the
United States was impossible at this time may have also influenced the German change of
attitude. They had done enough damage to their relations with the Americans. They did not
want to damage it any further with Great Britain.
For whatever reason, Germany policy quickly reversed. It was certain by now that
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their plans had failed. Instead of improving their position in relation to the United States,
Germany had increased the bad feelings that had existed between the two countries since the
1890s. Germany had not successfully divided the United States and Britain. The blockade
did not weaken the Monroe Doctrine, but helped to legitimize it. The whole affair was a
spectacular failure for German diplomacy.
It has been the purpose here to propose a possible explanation for German intentions
in the Venezuelan blockade. In diplomacy, no country does anything without having some
motivation behind it. In this instance, the British probably hoped to improve relations with
the Kaiser, but Mitchell's contention that Germany sought only to better relations with Great
Britain makes little sense. German fleet building and their drive to become a world power
focused on weakening England's control of the seas. Germany had much broader goals in
mind; their foreign policy was based on undermining British strength in any manner possible.
Germany possibly saw in the blockade an opportunity to achieve these ends. The methods
that it employed in prosecuting the blockade produced provocation in the United States as
intended. Germany attempted to downplay their role and to make it appear that Britain was
responsible for the indiscretions. Germany also tried to achieve the same purposes creating
problems for the United States with Britain.
The Venezuelan affair is a perfect example of the bad diplomacy that is often
associated with Germany under the Kaiser. While no one knew the exact nature of their
planning, Germany could not disguise their actions or pass them off on the British. The failure
ofGermany to recognize how much distrust and suspicion existed against them in The United
States and England was the biggest mistake of their diplomacy.
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During the three-month period, from December 1902 to February 1903, Germany
possibly tried to ruin relations between the United States and Great Britain. There is
circumstantial evidence in the documents that cover the period. The object was to weaken
the enemy, England, with whom Germany had allied temporarily during the crisis, and to
strengthen Germany as a result. The outcome was the reverse of Germany's intentions and
they only succeeded in cementing Anglo-American friendship and ruining German relations
in both countries. This failure of Gennan diplomacy was to have lasting effects, leaving the
United States suspicious of Germany for many years to come.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
In 1902, both the United States and Gennany believed that a fleet of powerful
battleships was necessary as a naval power. In a naval war, the battle fleet would engage the
battleships of the enemy and decide the outcome of the war. Both countries did possess large
battle fleets at the time of the Venezuelan crisis, but the chance of their ever confronting each
other was negligible. Gennany could not get her fleet across the Atlantic to face the
Americans and the United States Navy had a similar situation. The apparent parity of the
fleets is also misleading because the United States battleships of the period were far superior
to contemporary Gennan battleships in almost every respect. Simple arithmetic does not
work here. Germany could have had twice as many battleships as the United States and still
have been no threat to the situation in the Caribbean.
Pro-Roosevelt historians would like to believe the story of Roosevelt wielding the "big
stick" against the wily Kaiser, but the story is not altogether accurate. No doubt exists that
Roosevelt used the presence ofthe Navy to his benefit in the crisis. No one will probably ever
know whether Roosevelt delivered the supposed ultimatum or not. The exact nature of this
"ultimatum" needs clarification. In most studies, historians imply that this meant war between
the two countries. Yet Roosevelt only claimed to be sending Dewey's fleet to monitor the
situation and make sure the Gennans did not take any Venezuelan territory.
This study has shown that war between the United States and Germany was not a
possibility during the Venezuelan crisis due to the limitations of the warships of these
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countries. Americans misjudged the German threat to the United States at the time. Many
subsequent historians, notably Mitchell, have done the same. Some Americans knew the
reality of the situation. Admiral Dewey, during the height of the crisis, commented on his
assembled fleet: "Germany could not possibly get a fleet over here that could fight such an
aggregation."1 This is a very accurate assessment of the situation.
Gennan intent is another aspect of the crisis that warrants more intention. The goal
was definitely not territorial gain. The stated purpose, debt collection, is also suspect. This
study has suggested another explanation for German intentions that fits not only the situation
but the long-range goals of the Kaiser and his government. Germany thought the Venezuelan
crisis could help them challenge the British command of the seas. By destroying Anglo-
American relations, many opportunities would arise for Germany. This failed because the
United States and England viewed Germany with too much suspicion. Germany tried to hide
its actions behind its English allies, but from the beginning Germany was singled out in the
United States as the instigator and leader of the Venezuelan Blockade. The entire affair was
a disaster for German diplomacy, making its own relations worse with both the United States
and Great Britain. Relations between the United States and England came out even stronger
than before the crisis, compl.etely the opposite ofGerman aims.
The long-term effects of the Venezu.elan Blockade were many. Great Britain
removed its navy from the Caribbean in recognition of the superior strength of the United
States in the region. Germany never mounted another military expedition to the area. In
April 1903, as a direct result of the Venezuelan Crisis, Theodore Roosevelt made the first
public announcement of his Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The most lasting effect was
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to German relations with the United States. The Venezuelan crisis marks the lowest point
in German-American relations to that date. As the German fleet began to expand under
Tirpitz' plan, Britain began a naval anTIS race with Germany that played a large role in starting
the First World War. By 1910, Germany had become the second largest naval power in the
world. By now, however, no opportunity existed for the alliance that Tirpitz had wanted.
The Venezuelan Blockade was only a part, but a significant one, in a series of foreign
relations blunders that led to war in 1914.
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